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The subject of this thesis is the theology of the 
being of &od* and we shall be locking at the problems 
raised for such theology by Fouefbaoh* a ’’taaenoe of 
Christianity* (1641)* The method e^loyed is systematic 
exposition not so much of Feuerbach's thought considered 
for its own soke as of the problems which Feuerbach himself 
so acutely raises* end the manner in which he raises them. 
Feuerbach mss act a systematic thinker* He writes in a 
vigorous* often poetic stylej his method is to exhort with 
prophetic passion rather then to analyse* discuss or argue* 
The- reader of Feuerbach's work may find himself swept from 
off his feet and carried to a position of passionate 
agreement* without always being able to see or understand 
hew he has arrived at that position* Or if the reader is 
not sensitive to auch treatment* he will lny the hock aside 
In deopcir. This analysis will be* in part* an attempt to 
force 3OC30 logical rigour upon his work* without falling 
into the temptation merely to socro off him* hat he eays 
may be aayable systematically.
i. a m  concept of faith.
We will begin with an exposition of Feuerbach* s 
concept of faith. We will develop this exposition by 
taking in turn four facets of Feuerbach* s understanding 
of faith in answer to the question: What is Christian 
Faith?
ki, 1 I t: ■  i; j u i B H V "rt H  S
We shall discuss first the subject of Faith as 
Projection, then Faith as illusion, third: faith as aw . cr ;
function of human subjectivity, and fourth: Cod, the 
object of faith,
■
.
■
In the Preface, Feuerbach calls himself "a natural 
philosopher in the realm of mind” (1). Faith is a 
religious phenomenon, a phenomenon to be understood. He 
sees his work in terms of ANALYSIS and REDUCTION (2); the 
subject-matter of his Analysis is the tradition of Christian 
theology, and his method is that of reducing theology to 
Anthropology, understanding theology exhaustively in terms 
of man* We shall understand this method when we see it 
in action.
For Feuerbach, faith is the unconscious process whereby 
the idea of the perfect essenoe of man, purified from all
(1) "Essence of Christianity** (subsequently referred to in
these footnotes as "Essence**) p * xxxiv
(2) "Essence" p. xlili
3.
defects and limitations, is posited in existing reality 
as though an Object of experience corresponding to the 
idea existed in actual reality*
"Faith", he says, "isolates God; it makes him a 
particular distinct being," (1), Faith speaks of God 
EXTRA NOS: Faith externalises God. This is a 
projection, it is an illusion, a dream* God can be 
understood in terms of human self-consciousness or human 
subjectivity. Thus, we have four facets to his doctrine 
of faith: PROJECTION, ILLUSION, SUBJEGTIVrrT, GOO.
Theory of Faith as Projection.
I will begin by quoting two passages: First, "Man 
projects his being into Objectivity, and then makes himself 
an Object to this projected image of himself, thus 
converting it into a subject*.,.a being other than himself." (2) 
Second, in faith, "man propels his own nature from himself, he 
throws himself outward". (3)
In these passages Feuerbach uses the word faith for the 
phenomena of the religious man*s eonvietion that God is in 
some sense external to him* I shall develop the Analysis
1) "Essenoe" p.247
2) do. p.29-30
3) do* p.31
at this point by a short consideration of the 
ontological Argument, which will show that this 
Argument is of central importance for Feuerbach. There 
are five references to the Argument in the "Essence of 
Christianity" (1). Anselm argued that God is THAT-TKAN-
WHICH-NOTHING-GRJBATER-CAJWBiE-TlrK)UGHT (or conceived). Id 
quo nihil maius cogitari potest, Deus est. Since God, 
so defined, could not exist "in intellectu” only, because 
this would involve a logical contradiction, God must exist 
"in re" also. whether it is a believer or an unbeliever who 
so reasons, does not affeot the argument. But Feuerbach 
was very interested in the Argument, for he understands 
faith in terms of its logic. He calls it "the most 
interesting proof" (2), because faith may be understood as 
an attempt to project, rather than argue, the idea of God, 
from its existence in the mind (in intelleotu) to an 
existence in actual reality (in re). Faith is an attempt 
to ascribe Ontological Status to that which is an idea in 
the human mind. Or it might be described as an attempt to 
give a psychic phenomenon the status of an extra-psychic, 
distinct and independent being. Faith confesses God as 
NQH-EGO, or in Luther’s words "indubitably extra nos", it 
has projected that which is thinkable out into the objective 
world, as though it were in principal experienoable.
As such, Faith is an illusion, which brings us to 
our second facet:
(1)CT;Anselm: Proslogion ch.II transl. Charlasworth, p. 116-7J 
and for Feuerbach’s references of. "Essence" pp.17, 36, 98, 
198, 213.
(2) "Essence" p.198
Faith as Illusion:
"Creaming**, writes Feuerbach, "is the key to the 
mysteries of religion" (1) . "The t mdaaeatal dogmas of 
Christianity are realised wishes of the human heart" (2).
Here we encounter Feuerbach in a wider context, for he is 
not confining his Analysis and Reduction to God alone, but 
to all the important doctrines of the Christian faith. The 
Incarnation, the Trinity, the Logos, God as creator, God In 
relation to Nature, providence, mysticism, prayer, miracle, 
resurrection, heaven, immortality, all these and more, are 
ANALYSED AND REDUCED.
The illusion of all Christian doctrines may be 
formulated as a FALSE regarding as OBJECTIVE that whioh is 
subjective, a mistaken seeing of the world as a wonderful 
dream, an unconscious attempt to realise the deepest wishes 
of man in actual reality. Religious faith is illusion, arid 
Feuerbach seeks to waken men to the "simple daylight of 
reality" (3). We will leave the question of the subjective 
aspect of faith until the next section. It may be pointed 
out her© that Feuerbach understood his work as an 
elimination ©f Illusions and a withdrawing of projections. 
"What was formerly contemplated and worshipped as God", he 
writes, "is now seen to be something human." (4). There is a 
process in theological thinking, according to ^euerbach, which 
is an ever-increasing self-knowledge* The first title of the 
"Essence of Christianity" was to have been crttfo-rov 2
KNOW THYSELF. Bis work is something of a climax in this
(1J "Essence" p.141
(2) do. p.140
(3) do. p.xxxlx
(4) do. p. 13
process of thought because he uncompromisingly identifies 
knowledge of God with knowledge of onself. The illusion 
of faith is, in general, the false attempt to make 
religion into anything other than a human business; the 
attempt to believe that the dreams and wishes of each man 
have come true. It is the Christian’s negative attitude to 
the world which arouses Feuerbach’s prophetic passion.
There has been no Christian theology which has not correlated 
in some manner the predicament of man with the addressing 
Word of God to man in that predicament. Whether the 
theology has leant more heavily towards the initiative of 
God or towards the situation of man, there can be no theology 
which says nothing about man or nothing about God.
Feuerbach’s thought enters theology as a fundamental question, 
the form of the question raises the theological understanding 
of mir&ole in such a way as to ask of the theologian: Can 
miracle be anything other than a negating of the world and 
the human? Feuerbach’s answer to his question was a 
theological one: Faith is an illusion, and only the man who 
can know himself well enough to admit this, can really affirm 
the world and his own humanity. (1).
Faith as SUBJECTIVliY:
Feuerbach’s Concept of Faith is best understood in 
relation to his notion of subjectivity; though faith is always 
•faith-in’ and therefore involves an Object of faith, whether 
it be God, or Christ as God-for-us. We begin with the 
notion of faith as subjectivity, and consider the Object of 
Faith in the next section.
"Faith*, he writes, "is belief in the Absolute reality 
of Subjectivity" (l), This preposition is expressed in 
various forms, for instance:
"frod is the highest subjectivity of man abstracted from 
himself", (2).
Or: "Faith is nothing else than confidence in the reality
of the Subjective in opposition to the limitations, or lews, 
of nature, or reason*. (3).
Or: "Faith is the undoubting certainty that his own
subjective being is the Objective or Absolute being, the 
being of beings*, (4)
What is meant by subjectivity in this context? 
Subjectivity is so often a word used to express some vitally 
important part of a man's thought, and it is just as often the 
most ambiguous term he uses. The case of *euerbaoh is no 
exception. To answer the question of what Feuerbach means by 
subjectivity is to begin to turn away from his negative polemics 
against illusions and evasions, and to turn towards his 
philosophy. It is to ask how Feuerbach understands faith, how 
he explains it by means of an hypothesis, how he relates faith 
to the anthropology which is the foundation of his thought.
The hypothesis he tests in the various chapters of his 
"Fssdnoe of Christianity" is formulated in the Latin 
proposition: HOMO HGPXKZ DEU3 SST (3). MAN IS IMS GOP OF KAN.
At present, however, we are considering the hypothesis that 
faith can be explained in terms of human subjectivity, that 
which appertains to the human subject, rather than any entity 
or entities outside man and knowable by him as external to him.
1} "Essence" p. 126 
2) do. p. 31
3} do. p.126
"JSasence* p.127
do. pp. 83, 159, 271, 281
To come back to this point; that is, to return to it and 
understand it, we shall hare to go by way of Feuerbach's 
Introductory philosophical remarks. Men, he says, is the 
being who is not merely conscious, but is consoious of self; 
he is the being who is conscious of himself in relation to the 
species. We shall return to this idea of species in a 
moment. Man can also be defined as the only being for whom 
religion is possible. (1). Feuerbach then Identifies the 
two: self-consciousness is religious consciousness. He 
seems to think this is a deductive step: it is not. It 
may, nevertheless, be a correct step to take, though it will 
be an inductive not a deductive Argument. We can now, 
however, see that when Feuerbach looks to subjectivity to 
explain Faith, he is meaning that faith can be understood 
within his own philosophical analysis of the consciousness 
which is specifically human, - SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. Ve will 
turn to this Analysis in a moment. We must say one last 
thing on the subject of Subjectivity. In relation to 
Feuerbach's employment of the word, it is worth asking whether 
he is using it as a definitive concept; by which I mean, does 
he wish to confine or limit the term faith to a particular 
context? Is that context such that Faith is logically 
defined in terms which are laid down by the context? That 
is to say, is faith defined in terms of subjectivity, thus 
making the conclusion that it is Illusion or projection 
tautological? In relation to the use of the word faith in 
the main tradition of Christian theology, if we could speak 
of such a tiling, we might ask of Feuerbach's use of the 
concept: "When Feuerbach speaks of faith, is it of faith that 
he is speaking?"
(1) "Essence" pp. 1 and 2
Zh, OBJECT OF FAITH i
Christian faith is either understood as faith In 
Ood slowly, or faith in Jesus Christ as God-f or-us,
Feuerbach's Analysis of shat Christian theology, and 
particularly Luther, says of suoh a faith led him to the 
conclusion that neither Cod nor Jesus Christ vers anything 
other than human, HOMO BQUXWX DEU3 KBT. Since the 
doctrine of the Xnoamation claims precisely that Cod became 
men, Feuerbach naturally interprets it in terms of his thesis.
We will turn first to what he says about Cod, as the Object of 
faith, and then consider the Incarnation.
The structure of human self-consciousness o n  be shown, 
Feuerbaoh thinks, to be a twofold X and 3800. Thought is an 
internal relation between a self and Other? in thought, man, 
he ays, "converses with himself” (1). Man has an outer life, 
ids relation to external reality, to other persons and things; 
he also has an inner life, whioh is a life of dialogue with 
himself* *M«nn, he writes, *1$ himself at ones X and XUQtJ.* (2) 
Xn cognition, subject knows objectj remove all objects 
methodically, and man is still conscious of himself. What is 
this Other Self of my self-consciousness? Feuerbach's answer 
to this question is: 600. God is man's essential nature, of 
whom he is oonsoious in his self-consciousness• The being of 
(tod is the human nature purified and freed from all the limits 
and imperfections of the individual man. Sod is the Other of 
whom sy consciousness is oonsoious. Thus, Feuerbach can say 
with Augustine that* n0od is nearer, more related to us and 
therefore store easily known by us than sensible, corporeal 
things." (3)
"Kssenoe" p.2.
(2) do. p.2. Also p.66.
(3) Do Oenesi ad Littaram 1v o:16 quoted "Essence" p.12
10.
&hat, we may ask, is tills perfect essence, this idea 
of the species, which is G-od? Sometimes Feuerbach speaks 
as if he meant an Ideal, a perfection, which transcends 
the particular. Homo homini Deus est seems to mean: 
Essential or perfect man is the G-od of particular finite 
and limited man* But this is not always clear, as in the 
proposition: "In and through God, man has in view himself 
alone" (1). Is God, here, my finite self? These 
considerations lead us to the subject matter of the second 
half of the chapter. This subject-matter concerns the 
relation between the self and the other in two contexts. 
First: the Self and the Other in Self-consciousness.
Second: the Self and the Other in Consciousness of an 
external, independent Other. Feuerbach*s Christology 
raises these questions in a similar way, and it is to this 
aspect of his thinking that we now turn.
"The Incarnation", says Feuerbach, "is nothing else 
than the practical, material manifestation of the human 
nature of God." (2) "In the inearaation, religion only 
confesses, fhat in reflection upon itself as theology, it 
will not admit, namely that God is an altogether human- 
being." (3) He follows Luther in Galatians ("There is no 
other God besides tthis man Jesus Christ": Corjmentaxy on 1:3, 
pp.42-5) in speaking of Christ as God-for-us, though he takes 
the additional step of eliminating the dialectic whioh led 
Luther to insist also upon the infinite transcendence of God. 
Feuerbach understands the Incarnation as the ultimate
(ij "Essence" p. 30
(2) do. p. 50 
(3; do. p. 56
11.
manifestation of the lore of God. "As Cod has renounced 
himself out of love,* ho writes, "so we, out of lova, 
should renounce God, (1) God became a man, <md as far 
as wo are concerned God is man, our fellow man or the 
species.
The Son of God Is God made finite; since God is the 
idea of the species, the essence of man; the Son of God is 
the idea actualized or realised as an individual. "With 
the Christians, God is nothing else than the immediate unity 
of species and individuality, of the universal and 
individual being." (2). In Christ, the wishes of the 
human heart are realised. (5). God is the Essence of the 
Species, known in the imagination only; Christ is what the 
imagination imagines, made objective. (4), The Incarnate 
God is thus the Unity of the ©ssenoa of the species in an 
individual. Here again, we come up against the question of 
the Ontological Status of the Other in its relation to the 
self, and the problems which are raised by Feuerbach’s
answer to this question.
#
In conclusion, Faith is the attitude of belief, trust 
and worship of the Idea of the Essence of the human species, 
known as the Other of ny self-consciousness. It is an
illusion when it projects this Other out of subject- 
consciousness as though it existed in external reality as an 
Object of Consciousness• It is a dream of subject- 
obnaciousness: it is human. Moreover, faith tunas to Christ 
as the mediator between the relatively Abstract notion of
!1) "Essence" p. 53 2) do. p.153
3) do. p.140
4) do. pp. 75# 69.
essential humanity or G-od, whereas man turns to his 
fellow man as the mediator; therefore, says Feuerbach, 
faith evades the fundamental relation between man and man in 
its "excessive transcendental subjectivity** (1).
. :
So much for Exposition! We now turn, in the second 
part of this chapter, to some of the problems whioh have 
been raised but not discussed. This Analysis will 
formulate a second question, clbsely related to the first. 
Our first question was? What does Feuerbach mean by Faith, 
and how does he understand it? Our second question is: 
What is the relation between the self and the other whioh 
is articulated in Feuerbach1 s understanding of Faith?
(1) "Essence” P*167
13.
Feuerbach's episteoology Of the inter-human seems to 
comprise of two opposite and oontradictoiy tendencies: he 
seems to be going in two directions at once. The problem 
can be approached in a number of ways. It could be said 
that Feuerbach wishes to derive self-consciousness from 
consciousness of the Other and also say that Consciousness 
of the Other was only a form of Self-consciousness. Or it 
might be better to express this by saying that there is so 
knowledge of oneself as a human-being without relationship; 
and yet knowledge of the Other is only a form of knowledge 
of Oneself. The latter tendency is most difficult to
understand. Feuerbach speaks of it as the "eye seeing
itself” (1), or he may say, "Consciousness of the 
Objective is the self-consciousness of man" (2). We could 
not be blamed if we called his epiatemelogy solipsist and his attitude 
to human relationships a form of philosophical narcissism, if we 
might use such a phrase. But Feuerbaoh is very anxious to 
maintain precisely the opposite thesis at the same time.
"Hie Thou", he says, "belongs to the perfection of the I;
♦Men' are required to constitute humanity, only ®en taken 
together are what men should and can be." (3) Thus 
Feuerbach clearly wishes to understand the being of man not in 
terms of the Conscious Ego of his thoughtful isolation, but in 
terms of man WITf! man in community. He also wishes to take the 
interesting and important step of making human sexuality the 
centre of his understanding of human-being with Another, (4)
"Essence" p.156
2) do. p. 5
.3) do. P.155
4) do. p.167
The distinct ion between I and Thou is seen fundamentally in 
terms of the distinction between man and woman, and the 
condition of all personality and all consciousness, (1)
The truly human-being needs another human-being, man needs 
woman, to become in any way complete or whole as a human-being, 
The Christian does not need the Other in this primazy sense, 
for his faith speaks to the Other whoa he has falsely- 
externalised in his imagination, that is, G-od, The 
subjectIt® Is regarded as objective, the real unreal,and 
the unreal real (2).
How can we understand this powerful tension within
Feuerbach** epistemclogy of the Inter-Subjective relation
between man and man? " hich is primary: self or Subject-
Consciousness, or Consciousness of the Other? We find a
strangely similar tension in Jeuerbachfs great teacher, Hegel,
This may throw some light upon the problem. In that
remarkable chapter upon Self-Consciousness in the
’Phenomenology of Mind", Hegel says:
In self-consciousness, "I distinguish myself from
myself,*,,I thrust myself away from myself. Consciousness
of Another, of an Object in general, is indeed itself
necessarily Self -Consciousness, refleotedness into Self,
consciousness of self in its Otherness," (3) Here Hegel
makes a statement whioh corresponds to the second direction
of Feuerbach* s epistsmology: Consciousness of the Other is
self-consciousness. But Hegel, in another passage, writes: 
"Self-Consol usaess exists in itself mod ter itself....by the
fact that it exists for Another Self-Consciousness, it IS only
by being acknowledged or recognized." {4} This is Hegel*s
(1) "Essence" p* 92
(2) do. p .127 and 126
(4P '  HaS!1: Phano88?olosy ^ Kind.pj^1
way of saying there is no I where there Is no Thou.
But how does Hegel himself deal with these conflicting 
principles? for Hegel, self-consciousness emerges only at the end 
of a "life M  death struggle" (1). When one self-consciousness 
faces another, a twofold event occur®, first, each self- 
consciousness loses its own self and finds itself in the Other, 
and the consequence of this is that it does not regard the 
other as real but sees its own self in the other. There is a 
mutual attempt to destroy the Other, but at the same time each 
Self-Consciousness risk® its own life. Each proves himself 
and the other in this struggle, but at the cost of possible 
annihilation. Thus, in Hegel1® words: "Consciousness finds
that it immediately 13 Ml) IS NOT (ay italics) another 
consciousness, as also that this Other is for itself only when 
it cancels itself as existing for itself, and has self-existence 
only in the sell"-existence of the Other,.. .Thus they recognise 
themselves as mutually recognizing one another," (2) Notice 
her©: the IS and the IS NOT : In Feuerbach*s *I-Thou* 
terminology: this passage is saying : The I emerges only 
through the THOU at the risk of possible annihilation. The 
unreality and the r ality of the Other, together with the 
recognition and negation of the self, must be held in 
dialectical tension. The emergence of self-consciousness, 
of the I, is both a negation and an affirmation of eelf and 
Other, We have her© a circular movement of thought from 
solipsism to self-negating nihilism.
Returning now to the terms in whioh this problem was 
raised, Feuerbach* s Concept of Faith, we see that because for 
Feuerbach the essential nature of the species was the Other of
(1) Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind. p.232 
(2; do. do. ' do. p*231
Self-Consciousnessi we are formulating a curious but 
important question. Bo we derive our idea of the
essential man, that is : G-od, from our consciousness of
Other menj or is our knowledge of other men really only a 
knowledge of our essential self, i.e. Cod? Or, in other 
words: Is Cod the Thou of my fellow man, or is Cod the Thou 
of the "complete unity of I end Thou* whioh is my self- 
consciousness? Thus two assertions emerge: That Cod is 
some nebulous human ideal, and that my fellow man has no 
real existence but is only a reflection of my own self to 
myself.
Now, this is one way of formulating the main problem 
raised by Feuerbach1 s dealing with the relation between the
self and the other. Our excursus into Hegel* s
Phenomenology throws light, of an historical nature, upon 
the problem. Perhaps we can see that Feuerbach inherits 
it from Hegel. But, by so doing, we must not allow ourselves 
to think that we have understood, never mind resolved, the 
problem. My own oonolusion is that we cannot move forward 
in our present terminology. That is to say, our formulation 
of the matter has not yet grasped the question whioh must be 
asked in order to take farther steps forward. To revise the 
form of our question, we would have to oome to grips with the 
Idealist philosophical tradition from Descartes to Hegel in 
which the problem of the relation between the self and the 
other is articulated in terms of self-consciousness and 
object-consciousness. We cannot undertake to do this in this 
present study.
Perhaps we might be tempted to confine attention to the 
area of Feuerbaoh*s Analysis in whioh he seems to go beyond 
Hegel in stating that the Egoeentrio *1* of Cognition is not
an adequate starting point for philosophy. Feuerbaoh 
makes it clear that for him there is no I without a Thou.
But it would be quite wrong to ascribe this development to 
Feuerbach; for as we have seen there is no self- 
consciousness, for Hegel, unless there is also recognition 
or acknowledgement by Another. (1) I would suggest that 
Feuerbach is merely re-expressing Hegel's thoughts in 
another terminology.
Or again, we might undertake a phenomenological 
Analysis of human-being with Another, along the lines 
implicitly laid down by Feuerbach, in order to reveal the 
essential structure of the ontology of human-being whioh 
his work pre-supposes. This method would be beset with 
complexity, but would perhaps clarify the adequacy or 
inadequacy of his anthropology enough for us to formulate 
the question satisfactorily.
The thought which lies behind these suggestions is 
that a re-statement of Feuerbach' a Analysis of faith in 
other terms would reveal his theory in a far more favourable 
light. It would be most unwise to leave a man's thought at 
the point where his terminology is found to be unsatisfactory. 
Clearly the problem is only partly linguistic. He analyses 
and reduces the theological language of Faith's confession 
to the Hegelian philosophy of self-consciousness and re- 
expresses some of this in his own I-Thou categories. He 
sees self-consciousness as consciousness of the idea of the 
species, ie. Cod; the rligious consciousness is reduced to a 
general characteristic or disposition of all men. The 
distinctive phenomenon of faith is the illusion that the idea
(1) Hegeli Phenomenology of Mind. p.229
of the species exists as a divine being independent of
man. The unresolved problem of this chapter is the
relation between the self as this ideal essence, or
unlimited perfection which faith calls God, and actual existing human-
bsing3 external to this internal self-consciousness. What
is the relation between the essence and the existence of the
species | or what is the relation between God and the human
oom unity, whioh for Feuerbach is the same question? In the more
general terms of a wider context, What is the relation between the
I and the Thou, between the self and the Other? It is this
question, whioh we will have to re-ask in another form, that
lies beneath Feuerbach's concept of Faith.
II. ANTHROPOLOGY.
Ota* first chapter raised, hut only briafly- 
considered, the philosophical and theological questions 
which are involved in Feuerbach* s philosophy of religion.
We looked at Feuerbach*s Concept of Faith. We saw that 
Faith was the illusory projection of that whioh is 
essentially human, into independent existence external to 
man; faith gave distinct Ontological Status to certain 
essential human qualities, freed from their finite limitations 
and defects, by positing them in a divine being which 
transcended the limits of the individual man. Feuerbach 
wishes to attack such a faith because it evaded the relation 
between man and man, with what he called its "excessive 
transcendental subjectivity". (1) $y this he meant that
faith turns away from the world and men to God, finding in 
God the answer to all needs and the realisation of all wishes. 
She purpose underlying Feuerbach* s "Essence of Christianity" 
was that man should withdraw such illusory projections and 
subjective imaginings, and emerge into the Hairople daylight of 
reality*. (2) Instead of speaking of Cod extra nos,
instead of worshipping him as a being external to man, we 
must recognize that Man is the Cod of Man: Homo homini deus 
est. (3) Thus, Feuerbach*3 Concept of Faith raises one 
fundamental problem, that of the relation between man and Cod, 
and man with his fellow man. Did Feuerbach wish to say that 
the first Homo of "Homo homini deus est" was to be 
unambiguously identified with the human Other, the human 
Thou; or has he some ideal or universal essence of humanity 
in mind? The two structural poles of theology, the I in 
relation to Cod, and the I in relation to the Thou, are
(1) "Essence" p.167
S2) do. p.xxxlx3) do. p.83, 159, 2?t, 281
identified by him in a highly problematic manner. This 
is our problem.
This chapter will take as its subject-matter Feuerbach's 
philosophical Anthropology. Feuerbach describes the method 
of his work as "Analysis and Seduction". His Analysis is 
of the central doctrines of the Christian Tradition, and he 
reduces these to his Anthropology. But this Anthropology 
is, for leuerbaoh, no mere 'distilled9 theology; he develops 
it as a positive alternative to Christian Faith, one whioh 
is fully able to affirm the world, and to take inter-human 
relations absolutely seriously. In it, he introduced what 
has since been called the "discovery of the Thou", which has 
an important place in a number of existentialist philosophies 
©f our own century. (1) We must, however, remember that 
Feuerbach was not writing a philosophical Anthropology; I 
intend to isolate his Anthropology, by eliminating, for a 
while, his main concern, whioh was a polemic against the 
transcendental evasions of Christian Faith. We shall, 
however, reserve the main body of our criticisms for Chaper 
5., where we shall be in a better position to understand the 
full extent of Feuerbach's thought.
Before we consider the aspects of his Anthropology 
whioh seem to have most interested Feuerbach himself, the 
I-Thou, Man-Woman relations, I want to deal with his 
psychology.
(1) Martin Buber; Between Man end Man p.182., also K. Heim, 
Christian Faith and Natural Science, p.A&f• also 
throughout "God Transcendent*.
1* Feuerbach* a Psychology: rests upon these fundamental 
categories j REASON, mTLL, and AFFECTION. Each man is the 
unity of these three taken together* "To think, to will, 
and to love", says Feuerbach, "is the absolute nature of 
man as man, the basis of his existence.* (1) We recognise 
these three familiar categories as those in whioh Kant 
classified all psychological phenomena* For Kant, the 
categories were employed to schematize the psychological 
as it appears to us as empirical phenomena* He 
distinguished sensibility and understanding as two parts of 
the first category: Reason. But Feuerbach does net add 
anything of importance to our understanding of the Categories, 
nor does he question their validity, but employs them in his 
reductive method* his first three chapters on the being of 
Cod are entitled 'Cod as a being of the Understanding,*
*Gcd as a moral being or law*, and *The Mystery of the 
Incarnation; God as love, as a being of the heart'* Thus 
the categories provide a basis for his "Analysis and Eduction" 
©f the doctrine of God* God is the illusory, non-objective 
being which, for Feuerbach, was the projected image of man, 
man as he would be if the three formal psychological categories 
were absolutized and made perfect* God infinitely transcends 
any particular human being who is limited and finite. He is 
nonetheless essentially human* Feuerbach depends for this 
kind of argument upon a simple set of premisses. First, we 
do not know or speak of God except as we know and speak of him; 
and our knowledge and speech about God is knowledge of and 
speech about human attributes absolutized or made superlative. 
God is in this sense human, end this is the only God we can and 
do have. God as Absolute Mind or intelligence, God as Absolute 
Will, and God as perfect love, is the absolutized human being, 
extended into infinity and worshipped as God.
(1) "Essence" p.3ff*
2. I-THOU; SELF-OTHEH: The distinctive contribution which
Feuerbach's Anthropology makes to philosophy is that it 
takes as its starting point the fundamental distinction 
between man and man, between self and other. There are 
two aspects to his thinking. First, he employs the 
categories I and Thou in this connection. Second, he 
emphasises the distinction between man and woman, and 
attaches considerable importance to this distinction when 
he outlines his understanding of the relation between two 
human beings.
We shall begin with the I-THOU Categories, and note in 
passing that it is necessary to eliminate later formulations 
of a similar type from our mind, so that it is of Feuerbach 
that we are thinking and no t someone else. Feuerbach 
smplys the categories in at least two contexts. First, he 
conceives of both thought and reflection in terms of a 
twofold polarity of self and other within consciousness. 
"Man”, he writes, "is himself, at once, I ana Thou. (1). We 
saw that Feuerbaoh identified the other of self-consciousness 
with God, so that he can write in this context: "Religion is 
man's consciousness of himself in his concrete or living 
totality, in which the Identity of self-consciousness exists 
only as the pregnant unity of I and Thou." This internal *1 
and Thou* in Feuerbach's reformulation of Hegel's under­
standing of self-consciousness, which was for him, the basis 
for consciousness of anything whatever. Self-consciousness 
is a distinguishing of myself from myself, and says Hegel,
"I am Immediately aware that this factor distinguished from 
me Is not distinguished•* (2) That is to say, the myself 
whioh I can know, cannot be Identified withAever elusive 'I'# 
because that whioh can be known as non-Ego is not the knowing
(1) "Essence" p.2.
(2) "Phenomenology of Mind" p.211.
subject* Thus, in Feuerbach's terminology, knowledge of 
self is the I knowing a thou, a Thou which the I is 
conscious of, and which is the knowable self of self- 
consciousness, Thought, for him, is "man conversing with 
himself” (p.2), We shall return to this us® of the 
Categories when we come to a wider formulation of the 
problem.
,' i ' * V  rt 1 ”J • - ’J :
The second use Feuerbach makes of the Categories is 
inter-personal. The Thou of Another human-being plays a 
major part in Feuerbach's thought, for him as for Hegel 
there is no I without another human-being in relation to 
that 1, Hegel introduced his chapter on Self-consciousness 
in the '’Phenomenology of Mind” with the following words s- 
"Self-consciousness exists in tself and for itself,,,«hy the 
fact that it exists FOR AKOTHKR self-consciousnessj it 'is* 
only by being acknowledged or recognised.” (1) Feuerbach 
reformulates this as follows? "The Other is my Thou - the 
relation being reciprocal. In Another I first learn, I 
first feel, that I am a man; in my love for him it is first 
clear to me that he belongs to me and I to him, that we two 
cannot be without each other, that only community constitutes 
humanity,” (2) In many passages, he insists that there is a 
qualitative, essential distinction between one human-being 
and another, and in those very passages asserts that? ”the 
Thou belongs to the perfection of the I*.
The I-HfOU relation between human-beings is understood 
by Feuerbach within the framework of post-Cartesian philosophy, 
where consciousness is the starting point. He develops his 
philosophy of consciousness by describing the emergence of a
(1) "Phenomenology of Mind" p,229 
(2} "Fssenoe” p,158
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human-being* s consciousness of his world. (1) Between 
consciousness of self and consciousness of world there is 
a middle car, gory, consciousness of the human Other. The 
Thou of Anot' or human-being mediates between I myself and 
that which is not me, the world.
"The Ego", he writes, "first steels its glance in the 
eye of a Thou before it endures the contemplation of a 
being which does not reflect its own image." (2) In other 
words, in order to become a HDMAN-baing, the I must meet the 
Thou in reciprocal relation.
Hot only consciousness of world, but also self- 
consciousness , which precedes it, depends upon the prior 
consciousness of the Other* Consciousness of self is the 
form of consciousness peculiar to humanity, (3) and self- 
consciousness is derived from the human THOU, the ALT.ii EGO, 
who is both distinctly separate from me as an individual, 
and essentially One with, me In a common humanity. This 
common humanity is the problem we shall consider when we 
turn to the place of God in Feuerbach* s Anthropology, for 
we must remember that his purpose is to reduce theology to 
anthropology. For Feuerbach, the doctrine of God is "an 
unconscious, esoteric, pathology, anthropology and psychology." (4)
But before we turn to the doctrine of God, I shell raise 
the third aspect of his Anthropology, which is that of sexuality.
1 mention it because Feuerbach lays unusual emphasis upon its 
importance, and he gives it much more attention than, for 
instance, his psychological categories of Reason, Will, and 
Affection.
"Essenoe" p.82-3
2) do. p. 82
3) do. p. t
4) do. p.89
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3* Human Sexuality? The relation between man and. woman is, 
for Feuerbach, not ^uat a random instance of the more 
general categories of I and Thou, Neither is it merely 
to be understood as a physiological distinction with 
psychological aspects* "The distinction of sex*, he writes, 
"Is not superficial or limited to certain parts of the bodyj 
it is an essential one*..•*"Personality is essentially 
distinguished into masculine and feminine”. (1) Feuerbach 
does not think that any philosophical anthropology can pass 
over the distinctions of sex, for it would be unable to 
understand the nature of human love, which rests upon two 
tenets. First, love requires two independent individuals, 
and second it consists in making whole the incomplete 
partiality of the individual by means Of a complementary 
fulfilment. Feuerbach notes that the Adam ef the Old 
Testament is incomplete without woman, whereas in the Adam 
of the new, there is a conspicuous lack of human sexuality. 
This point is added to the many which Feuerbach gathers 
throughout the "Essence of Christianity", in older to press 
home his polemic against the dehumanizing impulse within New 
Testament Christianity, (2) and Christian theology as a whole.
We saw that the human 1 of each individual emerges only 
through the X of another, the Thou, self-consciousness only 
through recognition by another self-consciousness • Feuerbach 
fills out this idea fith a detailed sketch of the relation 
between a son and his mother. "The love of the son to the 
mother*, he writes, "is the first love of the masculine being 
for the feminine* (5). In this passage on the feminine 
principle of love in the Godhead, we have Feuerbach reducing 
the theological dogma ef Mary as mother ef God to the 
psychological truth that the son's relation to the mother is 
of unique importance. The believer finds in the Virgin Mary
(1) * Essence* pp. 92, 156, 167, 170.
(2) do. p. 156
(3) do. p. 137
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what the sum of Feuerbach* & Anthropology finds In his 
own mother* In another passage, Feuerbach criticises 
Christian Faith because it makes man’s subjective wishes 
and feelings the "standard of what ought to be" (1). The 
believer is the man who has alienated himself from the 
natural and the human, including sexuality; his horror of 
these drives him to the supernatural or the anti-natural. (2) 
"That which offends his transcendental supernatural or anti- 
natural feelings", he writes, "ought not to be."(3) The
virgin birth, the gospel miracle stories and the resurrection 
are all examples of the profoundly negative attitude to the 
world in Christian theology .which Feuerbach wishes to 
reverse. He wishes us to take the incarnation so seriously 
that we renounce God and affirm with him that "KAN 13 THE GOD 
OF KAN4 i homo homini beus est. (k)
"As God has r nounoed himself out of love, so we, out 
of love, should renounce God", he writes. (5)
Ve now oome to the "Analysis and Reduction" of the 
Christian doctrine of God which plays such a very 
important part in Feuerbach's Anthropology. His use of the 
psychological categories, his understanding of self-oonsciousness, 
and consciousness of the human Other, and his Analysis of 
Sexuality, are all closely related to, if not actually 
dependent on, his doctrine of God. The first difficulty 
encountered when reading the "Essence of Christianity" is that 
there are almost as many explanations of the being of God as
(1) "Essence" p.137
(2) do. p*13$
(3) do. p.137
h) do. p. 83, 159, 291, 281
(5; do. p. 33
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there are pages In the book. Which, If any, are we to take 
seriously? What can we make of the poetic vision of the 
sentence: "This open-air of the heart, this outspoken secret, 
this uttered sorrow of the soul, is God", (1) or of the 
suggestion that God is the unutterable sigh in the doeps of 
the heart, or the essence of human tears? (2) In all these 
we find the underlying thesis that: "The beginning, middle 
and end of religion is man" (3) HCHO M I N I  DKUS SST (4).
The variety of individual explanations depends upon & 
single primary principle: that TOD IS THE MIRROR OF MAN*(5).
This difficulty first encountered in the variety of 
different definitions becomes more acute when the most 
important identification of God with the essence of the human 
species, is found to be indefinite and ambiguous. We have 
seen that knowledge of the idea of the essence of the species 
is in some way bound up with self-consciousness, and that the 
particular human Thou of ay fellow man mediates between myself 
and the species. Rut how the various categories are related 
is very difficult to determine. "Self-consciousness", writes 
Feuorbach, * is present only in a being to whom his species, 
his essential nature, la an object of thought." (6) In this 
passage God is identified with man* 3 essential nature, which 
seems to be an Idea of the Species, a Universal category 
embracing all that is essentially human. The Status of this 
Universal is difficult to determine, especially when Feuerbach 
in other passages speaks of the spesies as the aggregate of all 
human individuals. (7) Here Essenco is understood not so much
1) ’E83.no." p.122, a., p.62 "Essence'1 p. 1,
2) do. P.122, also p.61 , . 8180 P*2?0
do! p.184 <7) ’fiss.no." p. 83
[W do. p. 83, 159, 271, 281
,5) do. p. 63
in terms of Ideas and Universale, as the transcending of 
the limitations which exist for each individual, in the 
whole community ef mankind taken together. Here the 
question of the status of the idea of human nature or 
essence of the species must he raised.
In God, man contemplates his own nature, God is human; 
the being of God can be expressed as the human nature of God. 
But in what sense is God man? Is God my fellow man? Is he 
all men taken together? Or is he some ideal essence of 
humanity which has Ontological Status independent of the whole 
of human society and each particular Individual in that 
society? We might express these ambiguities as follows: The 
essential nature of man, or the ideal essence of human nature, 
knowable as the self of self-consciousness, is one thing.
The aggregate of all human qualities, the sum of all 
that mankind as opposed to an individual, is capable of, is 
another.
That which man would like to be, that which he wishes 
he could be, that whioh he dreams he is in the illusion of 
faith, is something else again. The answer to the question of 
clear definition in relation to Feuerbach is that he simply 
wasn*t interested.
There ore these three ideas involved In this trloky 
notion of Feuerbach1s. Ve suet note this fast at this point, 
although we shall not discuss the problem critic*1.1/ until 
Chapter V. (1)
(l) ef. Chapter 7. p. Vo#
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In order to formulate this problem satisfactorily 
we shall pass by Feuerbach* s arguments against the Christian 
understanding of Cod, which he concludes is illusion, and 
consider the place of Cod in his Anthropology. There are two 
views to he found within his thought, first that since Cod is 
our human nature, we need never speak of him, because we can 
say all that we want to say in purely psychological and 
anthropological terms. The second view, which is far more 
complicated, is also to be found, and it is this view which 
enables us to speak of a doctrine of &od within, rather than 
opposed to, his Anthropology. One of the passages in which 
this view is to be found most clearly is in his discussion of 
ethics in relation to Faith at the end of the "Essence of 
Christianity* .(1) Here, Feuerbach sets the Categories Faith 
and Love apart, as two opposing principles. Faith is exclusive, 
it is "imprisoned within itself11 (2). That is to say, faith 
must hold itself apart from the world in order to remain faith, 
it prides itself upon its special relation to Cod before whom 
it is humble. "But the humility of the believer11, answers 
Feuerbach, "is an inverted arrogance'1, because Cod is after all 
only the nature of man personified or projected into objectivity. 
Love, on the other hand, is for Feuerbach the opposite of faith.(3) 
Love doe snot evade the world, it affirms it. Where faith easily 
becomes orthodoxy and thus intolerance, hatred and persecution; 
Love begins with the ethical demands of human relationships and 
does not seek to evade them by turning aside to &od. Its very 
nature excludes orthodoxy and intolerance. Christian Love, on 
the other hand, is love tainted by Faith, because it posits love 
in Cod, outside and apart from human existence.
The purpose of Feuerbach's ethics is one of inversion;
(1) "Essence" p .247*281 
(2J do. p.249 
(3) do. p. 257
the divine predicates are no longer to be understood as 
belonging to a transcendent God* they are to be understood 
as divine in themselves and for their own sake* (1) The 
doctrine of the divine predicates becomes a set of ethical 
principles. Or, in his own words:
"What theology and philosophy have held to be Sod, 
the Absolute, the infinite, is not God} but that 
which they have held not to be God IS GOD: namely 
the attribute, the quality, or predicate*” (2)
"He alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates 
of the divine being - for example, love, wisdom, 
justice - are nothing* not he to whom merely the 
subject of these predicates is nothing.” (2)
If ethics, or in13r-personal relations, are now the 
concrete, imminent field of theology, and the existence of a 
transcendent God is forgotten, we have a doctrine of God which 
refuses to speak of God apart from, the actual situations in 
which the so-called divine attributes are worked into ethical 
decisions and actions* Thus, Feuerbach concludes the "Essence 
of Christianity" with the following words: "HOMO BDMIM DEUS ESTs 
this is the great practical principle. The relations of child 
and parent, of husband and wife, of brother and friend - in 
general of man to man - in short all the moral relations are per 
se religious. Life as a whole is, in its essential substantial 
relations throughout of a divine nature." (3) Every human 
relationship, in other words, is to be lived with what 
Feuerbach calls a "religious conscientiousness", with the same 
seriousness as the traditional believer once lived in relation 
to God. Thus, instead of the traditional compromise of love by 
the exclusiveness of faith, faith itself is excluded, and love 
placed at the oentre of theology. Ethics has taken the place
of theology as traditionally understood.
(1) "Essenoe" p. 264, 12*ff*
(2) do. p. 21 (3) "Essence" p. 271
But to say that intar-huaan ethical relations are 
religious or divine in themselves, and are to be taken as seriously 
as the relation to G-od once was, is to remain much too imprecise. 
Does Feuerbach actually wish to say that the hum&n*being I love 
is God for me, or is G-od othor than the particular human Thou?
The human nature of God is formulated in a number of ways, and 
in his reduction of chris tology, Feuerbach exchanges the human 
Thou for Christ as mediator between the Idea of the Species, or 
God, and man. So that in this context, God is other than the 
human Thou (1). God is the sacred idea of the apeeies with 
when I am related through my fellow man* But this view would 
result in Feuerbach*s speaking of intar^human ethical relations 
as the step to a sort ef mystical union with the perfect 
essence of humanity} he codd hardly repeat the passage just 
quoted, that human relations are in and by themselves divine, 
and all that m  need retain ef Christianity.
Perhaps we can begin to grasp what is being asked when we 
again put to Feuerbach the questions: Is God my fellow man? Is 
he all men t&csn together? Or is he some ideal essence of 
huma dty which has Ontological Status independent of the whole 
of human society and each particular individual in that 
society?
At the beginning of this paper we spoke ef the two 
structural poles of theology, the 1 in relation to God, and the 
I in relation to the Thou. Feuerbach wishes to identify these 
poles, and we are now able to formulate the problem whioh this 
identification raises somewhat more dearly. In the reflective 
movement from theology to anthropology, the essentially human 
nature of God is realised, especially through the Incarnation;
!1) "Kssence* p«1592) do. p. *13# 50.
and instead of faith in God which involved love ©f mej fellow 
man, there emerges an ethic which needs no external divine 
Authority and which makes love of my fellow man in itself a 
truly religious relationship. The tension and possible 
contradiction liesin two rather different elements in this 
line of thought, the one which moves towards a sort of ethical 
Godlessness, the other which seeks to continue to speak of God 
but only in the context ef ethical relationships and only as in 
some sense human. Feuerbach knows of this tension; we can see 
him holding the tension when he wishes t© retain all the divine 
predicatee| all, that is, of what we in fact know of God; and yet 
to repudiate the separate existence of God external to man. (1)
It Is necessary to sunurarise his position at this point, 
though to do so is to take much for granted. God is the idea 
of perfect man, of the essence of the species. This idea is 
not limited to, and therefore transoends, the finite 
limitations ©f individual man; Gdd is all-loving, all-merciful, 
aanipotent and so on. I know this idea as the object of my 
self-consoiousness, the self or Other of myself which is 
knowable in Self-Consciousness. But since I need another 
human Thou to become human myself, since X become a self- 
conscious human-being only through meeting with, and recognition 
by, another self-conscious human-being, I only become conscious 
of God or the perfection of human nature through my fellow man.
I can come to know God, who is oy own essential nature, only 
through relationship with other men and women. Theology is 
ethics, faith has become love, God-centredness has become m&n- 
cantredness; God is an idea of much psyohic importance. But God 
has n© extra-psychic, independent existence. In this sense, 
Feuerbach* s ethic and indeed the whole of his Anthropology is 
Godless.
(1) "Essence1* p.21
To the question; Xs God my fellcw man? We answer that for 
Feuerbach ethical relatione between men relate them to the human 
God because through such relatione each man becomes conscious of 
God as the Other Self of his own so If-consciousness. To the 
questions Xs God the aggregate or sum of all men taken 
together? We answer that Feuerbach undoubtedly wished to 
avoid the philosophical difficulties of maintaining most of his 
thought around a universal concept which s tood In opposition to 
the empirical world, with an ontologioal status of its own. So 
he tried to give the universal empirical content and thus 
dis olve Its ideal nature; the idea of the essence of humanity 
embraces all that men actually are taken collectively. Where 
an individual fails another will succeed. So the universal 
essence of humanity is materialised and becomes the sum of 
that which the species is actually capable. This answer also 
answers the third question; which was concerning the status of 
the idea of perfect human nature or God. God is that which man 
would like to be; He is an infinite, omnipotent, omniscient 
human nature existing as an idea arising from the encounter of 
man with man.
It must be noted, in conclusion, that Feuerbach does not 
need to reduce the incarnation to anthropology, for he makes 
the incarnation the centre of his theological methodology; it is 
the prinoiple of the divine becoming human. "The idea of the
incarnation", he writes, "is nothing more than the human form
of God, who already in his nature, in the profoundest depths ef 
his soul, is a merciful and therefore a human God." (t) God 
becoming man is the essence of Christianity for Feuerbach. Row 
this particular interpretation of the Incarnation is not 
merely a part of Feuerbach* a thought; it is the essence of it.
Chrlstology, for him, is neoess rily atheistic, because it is.
(1) "Essence" p.51
as he says, the renunciation by God of his divinity. The 
motive for this renunciation is love. Love, a divine 
predicate, is "a higher power and truth than deity" (1). 
Cbristology has become an ethie of Love. Feuerbach*s 
Anthropology, which has been the subject of this chapter, is 
a theology reduced to an e thic of human relations, in which 
the Categories I and Thou are first formulated, and the 
relation between man and woman is given very careful 
attention. Moreover, Feuerbach* a doctrine of God has been 
found to contain not only the attack of all theologies which 
speak of the separate existence of God independent of man, 
but also the explanation of the essential nature of God as 
the essence of human-mature knowable only through the 
relation of the X to a particular Thou.
III. THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE.
Feuerbach* s philosophical theology depends in part 
upon one of the most important and interesting analyses of the 
nature of theological language in the history of Western 
Theology, He is a powerful exponent of one of the principal 
solutions to the problems of religious language, and there 
are few thinkers whose work better enables us to grasp the 
essential issues. X will begin simply by outlining the 
form in which he raises his questions for us.
Feuerbach* s thesis could be expressed in the propositions 
God is what we say he is. This eliminates the other 
traditional understanding of theological language which may 
be summarily expressed in the following proposition: God is 
in some sense 'other than* what we say about him. These two 
opposing views of theological language arc the subject-matter 
of this paper. Our problem might be formulated as follows:
If theological language is both to be used and understood 
unlvooally, then some form of anthropomorphism emerges as a 
necessary consequence. If, on the other hand, it is possible 
to use and to und rst&nd such language equivocally, then there 
is always an indescribable, unknowable "beyond": for that of 
which we speak is other than what we say of it, and this 
"beyond", if taken seriously, forces us to a form of 
agnosticism. We shall have to consider the relation between 
knowing and language in both these views, and we shall have 
to consider such theological problems as those raised by 
oataphatio or positive theology which employs affirmative 
propositions of various kinds in its method, and those raised 
by apophatio or negative theology, which employs a 
methodological critique,consisting of negations. Shis will 
mean that the Tradition of Eastern Theology, and particularly its 
central concept: iyvuitfu* (unknowing or ignorance) will
never be far from our minds.
We begin, however, with Feuerbach, [l).He reasoned that 
because all the divine predicates are the predicates of 
human personality (Love, Justioe, Mercy, Goodness &c.) 
except that in God they are unlimited and perfect, God is 
in some sense man*a human nature. This conclusion rests 
simply upon a literal or univocal interpretation of the 
concepts predicated to God. Feuerbach was fond of quoting 
Luther in support of his interpretation, and his understanding 
of Luther's christology amounted to the assertion that God 
exhaustively expressed himself in Christ, and could not, 
therefore, be separated from the humanity of Christ as one who 
was knowably different from Christ. Feuerbach thought himself 
a good Lutheran in his fundamental dependence upon the 
incarnation for speaking of the human nature of God. I will 
not hors be able to consider the justioe of his interpretation 
of Luther. The point I wish to make is that Feuerbach inherited 
from Luther the emphasis upon the Incarnation for the actual 
content of God-language, and a certain fear of what Feuerbach 
called "the dark background" (2) of God, the Deus Abaconditus 
behind the familiar humanity of the Incarnate Son. It is this 
"dark background" that we must consider more closely.
The essence of the Incarnation, of the God-man, was Love. 
Feuerbaoh is quite clearly happy with much traditional,
particularly Lutheran, ohristology. But, he asks, "Is God a 
being distinct from Love?" If he is, then Feuerbach fears what
he is beside love. "So long as there lurks in the background 
of love a subject who even without love is something by himself", 
he writes, God may be "an unloving monster, a diabolic being." (3) 
The point, however, is that we cannot know what God is if he is 
not what he is in Christ; and this unknowable darkness in the
(Ofor further discussion of dichotomy of. p.^7chap.IV
(2) "Essence" p*5btf*
(3) do. p.52
background, this bidden silent Other, threatens the peace 
of faith. (1)
"The alleged religious horror of limiting God by 
positive predicates is only the irreligious wish to know 
nothing more of God, to banish God from the mind", he writes(2). 
Or, in another passage, he says: "Wherever this idea that the 
religious predicates are only anthropomorphisms has taken 
possession of a man, there doubt and unbelief have obtained 
the mastery of faith." (3) The question we must ask is 
whether this is any more than a cheap attempt to put the 
case for eataphatie theology as naively and as rigidly as 
possible simply in order to attack it by dissolving it into 
anthropology. Our answer to this question must include an 
admission that there are times when Feuerbach seems to see 
only the sheer humanity of the divine predicates by 
eliminating all the rigorous reflection which usually 
accompanied the assertion of them, and which qualified them 
or clarified the precise mode of their application. On the 
other hand, our answer would also have to include the 
seriousness with which Feuerbach wrestled with the "dark 
background", the Deus Abscond!tus revealed by, but not 
eliminated by, the Incarnation, the unknowable 'otherness1 
of od beyond Christ. It was the problem of the 
Transcendence of God which led him to his human God. Christ 
is God for us, the only God our finite minds can know; as 
human-beings, argued Feuerbach, we cannot know God in total 
Independence ef ourselves. God as he is in himself is,
1 therefore*, identical to God as he is for us; we know God 
as he really is, human.(k) This response to the problems 
of religious language is diametrically opposed to that made 
by the Via Negative. We have just seen Feuerbach use such 
words as 'irreligious*, • doubt', and 'unbelief* to 
0 )  •SB— ao*'».1fc (3) "Ksa.no." p.17
W  <i0* P* *5 (4) a.. p.17. For an
exposition of the logic of this 
______ ________ _________  argument of. oh.IV. p. 6o£
characterize this theological method. In another passage 
he writes8 "The theory that God cannot he defined, and 
consequently cannot he known by man, is therefore the 
offspring of recent times, a product of modern belief*1* (1). 
It is true that Kant had reformulated the unknowability of 
God in a particularly powerful way in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, hut to speak of this tradition as a product of 
recent times is quite wrong. It was a live force in the 
Old Testament traditions (2), and the dominant tradition in 
most of the Fathers of the early church, not to mention its 
importance in the great world religions, particularly the 
Indian, for some thousands of years. So I maintain that 
whilst Feuerbach* s opposition to the Via Negative, or 
apophatio theology, is in part an attempt to make his 
anthropological reduction easier to accomplish, there is 
also the serious problem of agnosticism which he rightly 
sees to be the essenoe of the Via Negative. If God is 
other than what w e say about him, there is no knowing what
this otherness is, and a potentially threatening darkness
11
takes the place of the familiar God as Christ revealed him.
The underlying problems of which these considerations 
are a prelude is that of the relation between speaking and 
knowing, between language and theological knowledge* The 
question is whether the limits of language ooincide with the 
limits of knowledge* Is, in other words, that which is 
unknowable in God inexpressible? Is the Otherness of God 
unknowable because it is inexpressible? We cannot attempt
(1) "Essence"* p*14
(2) Ex* Is.lj.0s25, 55:8 and 9, &o.
to define hare the relation between knowledge and 
language, and we are well advised to avoid moving through 
the problem with one of the major philosophers, with the 
status of a passive passenger. The pitfalls are indeed 
numerous.
We can, however, say clearly that Feuerbach himself 
identified that which we say about God with what God really 
is. In other words, he used theological language univooally 
and refused to entertain any possibility of a "beyond* in 
God; he remained blind to anything which might transcend what 
we can ourselves know and say of God. God is human because 
our language is human language speaking about human realities 
If, on i&o other hand, God transcends in some sense what we 
can sey about him, is the limit ef our language still the 
limit of our knowledge? But we have seen that to question 
the fundamental ordering of the problem is to involve 
ourselves in more than we can manage here, (l) It would be 
simple enough to state dogmatically that the knowable is 
that which in principle can be an object of experience, or 
that which in principle can be empirically verifiable through 
observation. We could go on to limit the area within which 
the use of the category "knowledge" is applicable, and we 
could then idntify this area as that within which so-called 
‘meaningful language9 oen function. This would limit that 
which can be spoken about to that which can be empirically 
known| the unknowable is the inexpressible. We would be 
laying essentially the same foundations as those upon which 
Feuerbach9s thesis rests. But to make this procedure 
definitive would be arbitrary in the extreme.
(1) We return to this point again in Chapter 3V. p. to- tl.
The fact, however, that Feuerbach maintained, as we 
have seen, that language about God was really speaking about 
man, because understood uni vocally, such language employed 
concepts appropriate to the subject-matter of human nature 
and personality, means that ha is working within the limits 
we have indicated* Theological language meant for him 
literally what it said. This, too, is a form of dogmatism, 
and it is clearly inextricably bound up with the thesis he 
persistently advocates, that "Homo homini deus est*.
The apoph&tic method Of the Via Negative may be 
understood as a form of limiting critique, a sort ef dipping 
of wings. Its purpose is, on the other hand, totally 
different from the powerful western mode of thought to be 
found in Feuerbach*» work* Apophatie theology limits the 
applicability of theological language, it adopts a critically 
rigorous methodology and subjects all God language to its 
critique. The essence of the Eastern position is that it holds 
God the other side of the limits ef the expres ible and the 
empirically knowable. We should perhaps distinguish here
the mediaeval use of the Negative ¥ay, where, for instance,
Thomas Aquinas amplys it as a corrective to Affirmative 
Theology, and the essentially different use of apophatie 
method in the East, aid particularly in the Arocpagitiea.
For Thomas, the negations were the modus aignifioandi to be 
held in dialectical tension with the Affirmations, the Res 
Signifioata (l). In the Areppagitioa, on the other hand, 
the relation between apophatie and cataphatic theology is 
not that of dialectical tension but of the dominance of 
apophatie theology. The Via Negative, which refuses to form 
concepts of God, becomes the essence of theology. (2)
(1) yuaestiones disput&e VII: 5; for much of this paragraph I am 
indebted to Vladimir Los sky: "Mystical Theology of the Eastern 
Church" p.25ff.
(2) of: especially "On the Divine Names" and "Mystical Theology",
The point to be seen clearly in our present position 
is that Feuerbach is moving in precisely the opposite
direction to that of the Via Negative. Feuerbach, far
from conceiving God as beyond the limits of the 
expressible or the empirically knowable, reinterprete all 
God language by understanding it uni vocally, and thus sets 
God firmly WITHIN the limits of the know able and the 
expressible. The being of God is human nature absolutized 
cr divinized because theological language is, after all, 
human language employing human concepts. Understood literally, 
such concepts tan only be appropriate to the sphere of human
realities. God, far from being unknowable, can be known as
the Essence of the Spscias, ay fellow man, or the other which 
is the self I am aware of in self-consciousness. Hcwever 
ambiguous Feuerbach* a various explanations of the human nature of 
God may be, they all locate God within the sphere of the 
knowable and the expressible.
Thus Feuerbach stands in the tradition ©f western 
oataphatic theology, but his undialectioal literalism leads 
him to a human God. The apophatie theologian would object 
that Feuerbach had made the demonic error of identifying the 
symbolic nature of the divine predicates with the divine or 
ultimate itself. Thomas Aquinas was careful to hold this 
negation in dialectical tension with an unashamed affirmative 
theology. But he would have opposed Feuerbach’s arbitrary 
literalism. The difficulties we have to consider are those 
which arise when we recognize that if God is set beyond the
expressible and the know able, then only a theology of
revelation can reconnect God with men. It is the work of 
critique of the language in which this revelation is expressed 
that is again given to us, after a period of arbitrary
empiricism in which theological language was forced into the
framework of ordinaxy language end found to be meaningless. It 
is all too easy, however, to establish that theological language
can never be judged fey sueb norms | it is easy to start from 
a theology of revelation which gives theological language 
its own logical status, and therefor® to remain naively 
satisfied with seme past theological fashion. Theological 
language is an independent language* it is not, because of this, 
im une from ohan :®{ nor are theeenc criteria which can be 
employed in deciding what should and should not be said.
Feuerbach's undialectical literalism reveals the task of 
the theologians critique of theological language to H e  in the 
direction of apophatie theology. Apophatie theological method 
subjects the "horizon concepts" of theology to rigorous criticism 
by determining the precise mode of their application. Feuerbach 
negates the extra-empirical mode of application, the use of 
analogy and symbolj and the apophatie protest to this procedure 
is based uypon its making Bed knowable and expressible, and thus 
finite and even human. Max Scheler noted the close relation 
between the phenomenological method and Negative Theology.
"Many", he writes, "who make use of the (phenomenological) 
method, (in our present field or any other) are surprisingly 
unaware that as a method it is basically none other than that 
of Negative Theology. For the method of Negative Theology", he 
continues, "itself arose purely from the deep conviction that 
the divine and Holy form has such a prime elementary quality which 
oan only be demonstrated by a slow process of elimination and 
analogy.. .There is no doubt that as an approach and method, 
phenomenology was first employed, in the time of Plotinus, in 
exactly this theological context." (1) Scheler grasped quite 
clearly that the methodological "peeling away of correlates and 
contraries", and the "consequent laying bare of the phenomenon 
present to the inspecting mind" (2), was not rationalism, God
(1) Max Scheler: "On the Sternal in Man" p*171
(2) do. do, do. do. p.170
was not being inspected by speculative Season. Rationalism, 
he points out, understands the mystical nature ef Negative 
Theology as a rational theory, and as such must lead to 
"religious nihilism - even to Atheism'1 (1). Here, Scheler 
indicates the attitude of Feuarbach to Negative Theology* the 
Negative Way, we recall, was for him "irreligious unbelief and 
doubt" (2). For Scheler, the negative method served only to 
reveal the "positive datum", as he called it, (3) which is 
separated from the mass of "finite, non-divine, or merely 
analogous" propositions of affirmative theology (ibid). This 
positive datura is self-given, it ia given to the particular form 
of cognitive knowing of religious consciousness* We might wish 
to remove what Scheler has to say to more familiar ground, 
perhaps by making the positive datum kaow&bl© to faith alone* 
but nevertheless his identifying the method of phenomenology 
with the method of apophatie theology is of considerable 
importance to us. (4).
The Way ©f Analogy must now bo considered. I will 
maintain that the logic of theological analogy breaks down 
on the unknowability of God* Ferre, in his recent book,
(1) Max Scheler: "On the Eternal in Man" p*1 72
(2) do. do. do. do* ef.p. 4
(3) do. do. do. do. p.172
(4) To find a non-reductionist interpretation of these matters, 
and to undertake a systematic presentation of such an 
interpretation lies well beyond our scope at present.
of also p.4
•Language, Logic and God9 distinguishes two classes of 
analogies, First, the ’Analogy of Attribution" is the use of an 
analogy in which one analogate possesses the characteristic 
predicated of it in a "fomal" or univoeal manner, whilst the 
second analogste has the predioate applied to it in a derived or 
equivocal sense (l). Second, the "Analogy of proportionality1 
is the use ef the analogy in which the application of the 
analogue or predicate to the an&logates is proportional to the 
analog&tes concerned* The logic of both types of analogy is 
dependent upon the knowability of the analog&tes, or, in our 
context, upon an element of finitude in Bod, But Bod is infinite 
or not God at all, the empirical world finite* there is the 
basis for analogy?(2) I cannot here consider Barth9 s answer of the 
Analogia Fidei, though I would have to if this were an essay on religion 
language in modern theology*
Copleston gives us the traditional dialectical answer to 
Aquinas* he advocates an oscillation between the affirmative and the 
negative ways, between agnosticism and anthropomorphism (3) • But he 
does this on the presupposition that the Via Negativa leads finally to 
agnosticism and even atheism (4.) • His adoption of the f Ay of Analogy 
take3 this for granted. But we have already hinted that this is not 
necessarily so. The Nationalist understanding of apophatie theology
(1) F .Ferro. Language,Logic and Bod, p*70ff.
(2) I here presuppose Kant* s Critique of natural theology,in which the 
unknowabllity of Bod is asserted on the basis of the finitude of 
human reason and the exclusively finite applicability of the 
categories of thought and intuition.Thera is,unfortunate3y,n© place 
here for a full discussion of the reasons for such a presupposition.
(3) F.Coplestoni Contemporary Philosophy p.96ff, So does J •MacQuarrie* a 
•God Talk9,
(4) Macyuarrie p,213 "God Talk" writes: "In practice the Via 
Negationis has always be.-n supplemented by seme other way of 
talking about God, and apart from such supplementation, we do 
seem to fall into atheism,"
led to nihilism and atheism for Scheler, but the mystical
understanding did not. What is this mystical understanding? 
jfe have seen that it was a ole ring of the way for a 
positive datum, the actual experience of G-od as the 
unknowable and the inexpressible* Consequently, the 
Negative Way can never be resorted to in the absence of 
this experience. It would then be nihilism and atheism. 
Feuerbach's negative reduotio.i ruthlessly moves in 
precisely the opposite direction froia the Via Negative* It 
eliminates the possibility of the positive datum, and is blind 
to any experience of the Transcendent God whatever. So his 
reduction, far from starting from the unknowability and 
inexpressibiliiy of God, starts from the knowability and 
expreasibility of Bod and the uni vocal use of theological 
language* From this standpoint, Feuerbaoh rightly thought 
the Via Negative to be nihilist and atheist. Perhaps the 
Thomist presupposition that this was so, makes it as little 
able to understand apophatie theology as Feuerbach was*
I therefore turn to the view put forward in the 
Areop&gitioa, that the apophatie method is primary, and that 
the negative character of the method is only apparent.
Sci&ler endorsed this opinion, and made it the basis for his 
support of Husserl in calling phenomenology the basis of all 
the empirical sciences* He writes: "The proposition that....
Negative theology....is the basis of all positive theology (and 
net visa versa) is as certainly true as that the eidetic 
phencsaeaology of any object-group is the ultimate basis of the 
positive science cenmrned with that group" (1) Apophatie 
theology may, then, be the essential and primary theological 
method. We must consider the central concept of Eastern 
Theology: iyvto<5L*. previously mentioned at the beginning of this 
paper* A logical analysis of this concept must be undertaken
( i )  Max Scheler: On the Eternal in Man. p. 172
within the theological context of its use. It will
therefore be irrelevant to usher in criteria for 
determining its meaning from any alien context, even 
theological context.
A y v t o e - u c *  , or unknowing, was a concept dear to the 
heart of the mystics, and those who followed the way of 
contemplative prayer in Christian monasticissa. Wherever 
the influence of the so-called Arcopagita writings was 
felt, 'unknowing' was a theological term of primary 
importance. The unknown Syrian monk of the late 5th 
century had an immense influence upon Christian mysaioal 
theology, as is well known. The term la used by him 
primarily as a negation, a negation of all finite being to 
distinguish them from God. The negation is a methodological 
procedure integrated into the life of prayer, whereby finite 
knowledge is eliminated to reveal the infinite God. The 
invisibility of God is included in the concept, thus such 
mystical works as that written by an unknown author from the 
north-east midlands of anglaad, 3 n the 14th century was called 
the 'Cloud of Unknowing* (1). Thus ocyv/u^ ru* is a form of 
Vcot&ocf i-c:|uh£5 , a purification or cleansing, as well as a 
theological procedure. (2). The incomprehensibility of 
God in this theological tradition, as well as the 
in exp re s e ibi1ity of God, make the attempt to verify 
theological language fiiie; God is beyond uhe limit of all 
finiteknowing, and therefore, with regard to finite knowing, 
unknowable»
’A y .  u><?u&<- ia also a prophetic concept, one which wall 
articulates Tillich*a Protestant Principle. It is also
(1) of "Cloud of Unknowing" Intro, to Bums Oates ed. p.viiif. 
from Psalms 17*12, 96*2, I John 1:5
(2) of Loasky: Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church p.27
possible to understand his interpretation of Christianity * s 
final revelation in this light; "a revelation is final," 
says Tillich, "if it has the power of negating itself 
without losing itself" (1). For him, distinction must 
be made between revelation and the medium in and through 
which it appears. Christ is the medium of final revelation 
because he sacrificed himself, negating like the Via Negative, 
his own finitude, and pointing beyond himself to infinity.
Tims, christology is understood as a throwing of all 
absolutes and ultimates out of the finite world, so that no 
demonio deification of some part of this world is possible.
Only then can Cod be Cod and the world be world. It is this 
sort of definalizing of the worldly media,by mans of which Cod
Aft:
is obliquely known by man, that lies behind the ^astern concept
* /
Of c*yv,Loc: .
We have now come full circle from the point at which this 
chapter began. For here the contrast between the two 
propositions: God is what we say he is; and: God is in some 
sense 'other than' what we say about him, is clearly seen to 
be the conflict between apophatie and literal c&taphatic 
theology, between the Via Negative and Feuerbach's interpretation 
of theological language. Our way through the problem of the 
relation between speaking and knowing can now be seen to be 
arbitrary and provisional, because we have now arrived at a 
position in which there is a form of knowing, which through its 
refusal to halt at the finite object immediately known, uriknows 
this finite content, and thus grasps the ^oet^tov or Mysterium
(1) Tillich. S.J.I. p.148
of Transcendence • A  yvuicr Co< refuses to identify the Sod 
which Is referred to if theological language is used univoeally 
with the Christian Sod* Similarly, Luther wrote, BGod here 
in this life dealeth not with us face to face, but welled and 
shadowed from us* (of I Cor*13:12) Therefore, we cannot be 
without wells in this life* But here wisdom is required, which 
can disoera the veil from Cod himself. (l); here the wisdom 
Luther requires is the Via Negative, with its methodological 
discrimination cud critique of all the media of Cod's 
revelation.
Our contemporary problem is set by the recent emancipation 
of theological language from alien criteria of maningfulness, 
and theology is now at times in danger of saying too much* The 
Via Negative contains within itself the most rigorous criteria 
with which our critique of theological language can begin to 
move forward, once it is understood that it is a rationalistic 
misunderstanding of the Via Negative which leads to nihilism, or 
atheism* Through meeting Feuerbach's standpoint cm these 
matters, we have been enabled to see clearly where we cannot go, 
and moreover where we should now turn* X am not suggesting that 
the apoph&tic critique of theological language has the answer to 
our problems, our problems are far bigger than the subject matter 
of this paper} but I do suggest that in apoph&tic theology we have 
a tool for logical oritique which would tend to move our thought 
away from our positive assertions about God to God himself} 
admittedly only to founder on the inarticulate hiddenness of the 
Deus Absocnditus. But the attitude with which we then return to our 
oataphatio assertions is that of humour, because our positive 
theology is now seen to be a game between the times, a sort of 
eschatologioal hide-and-seek*
(l) Lutfrer: Galatians IX v*6 p.104
IV. 35IK BEING OF GOD.
We must now undertake to give a systematic exposition 
of all the aspects of Feuerbach's doctrine of the Being of 
God which have not so far been expressly dealt with* We 
have looked closely at Feusrb&oh's understanding of Faith, and 
we have thus seen the general purpose of his work. But we have 
not so far seen how he works his interpretation out in the 
detailed instances which make up the Boo trine of God. We have 
also given much attention to the Anthropology which Feuerbach 
offers as the end-product of his Analysis and Reduction of 
Christian theology, but we shall now have to consider the 
Doctrine of God as a human phenomenon in all its aspects, and 
thus complete our s tudy of what Feuerbach has to say to us •
The structure of the Essence of Christianity" consists 
of two parts, the first presents the Anthropology which 
Feuerbach maintains is the Essence of Christianity; the second 
is a support of the principil theses upon which the anthropological 
reduction is based, which draws attention to absurditiescehioh 
result if theology is not so interpreted. He notes in his 
Preface (l) that he intends the former part to be conoeraed 
chiefly with Religion, and the latter with theology. The 
distinction he seems to wish to make is that between a living 
faith, religious experience, and the intellectual formulations
(l) "Essence" xxrvii, also p.197
which he thinks misinterpret such a faith. The illusion of 
faith consists in the distinguishing of the divine nature from 
the human, regarding God as a being independent of the humanity 
of the believer. Thus he can justifiably claim not to oppose 
the phenomenon of religious faith itself, but only the way the 
theologian persists in understanding such a faith. But the 
implied naivety of the believer, in contrast to the 
sophistication of the theologian, has never fitted the mould 
Feuerbach has in mind for him. His God was never Feuerbach's 
human God; it is rather the particular philosophical and 
theological movement, of which Feuerbach was himself a part, 
that led to his radical subjectivism in theology. The simple 
believer has continued to hold himself apart from such thinking, 
and it is not simply the theologian who Insists upon the 
separation of bod from man as an independent being transcending 
the world, (l).
We shall have to ask one important question in the course 
of the Analysis which follows, and that is: To what extent
does the Anthropological und rstandiug of religion in the 
first half of the "Essence of Christianity" depend upon the 
disclosing of the absurdities of theology in the second? Or 
can the Anthropology stand independent of the refutation of 
the theologian's understanding of his subject-matter, in the 
second part?
Butt.parts of the "Essence of Christianity" are an highly 
individual, often colourful study of many of the aspects and 
versions of the conceptual expressions of the Christian doctrine
(1) of "Essence" p.56
of God. Feuerbach often seems to be summoning us to a 
feast of human Gods. His method lacks rigorous argument, 
but consists rather in the power to persuade by me: ns of the 
sheer force of these examples. Ve shall proceed by taking 
the problem of the inter-relation of the two halves of the 
book as one of our principal considerations although we shall 
also halt at various suitable points in the discussion to draw 
attention to some of the problems of which we have already 
become ware in the first three chapters. Thus I hope to 
continue to clarify individual questions as well as ask the 
wider question of the inter-dependence of the two halves of 
the book.
We begin with the first four chapters of the first part 
of the book in which the Anthropological essence of Christianity 
is formulated. The whole of this first part is presented in 
the form of seventeen mysteries, mysteries of human nature. All 
are in some way involving the Chris l ian doctrine of God, and all 
are the residue left over after the method of Analysis and 
Reduction has been thoroughly completed. The mysteries of the 
being of God are found to be essentially mysteries of the being 
of man.
The first chapter deals with God "as a being of the 
understanding" (l). In it he puts forward the argument, now 
familiar, that "in religion man contemplates his own latent 
nature", so that "God is not what man is, man is not what God 
is.” (2) To maintain such a position, Feuerbach sees that he
(1) "Essence" p.33ff*
(2) do. ibid
has tc show that ev8x*y part of the doctrine of God oan, if 
not conclusively, then convincingly, also be understood in 
purely human terms. His first argument starts by asserting 
that the disunion or estrangement between man and God could 
not be genuine unless God and man were essentially one. One 
example of this unity is the relation between the God of man*s 
intellectual striving and the human intellect itself. "God", 
Feuerbach boldly states, "is the objective nature of the 
thinking power" (1), or as we should need to correct him in 
the light of other passages, God is the power of the human 
intelleot objectified,or projected in the human imagination, 
and thus freed from its aotual limitations in the individual.
We are then offered a decidedly rationalistic interpretation 
of the Via Negationis, for he understands apophatic theology as a 
method of abstraction aiming at the concept of *infinite spirit* 
by means of an intellectual disengagement from the real world.
He ascribes this negative method of thought to the Greeks, the 
church fathers and the schoolmen. Thus all theologies of an 
abstract speculative nature are challenged} for are they not, 
after all, calling the ability of the human intellect to think 
abstractly, God? Their idea of God is simply a speculative 
flight of the human intellect.
All men, he continues, feel a sense of want, a void} and 
they therefore posit the perfection they themselves lack in the 
God which is the highest of which their intellects can conceive. 
Henoe, Feuerbach concludes, "All the metaphysical predicates 
of God are real predicates only when they are recognised as 
belonging to thought, to intelligence and to understanding". (2)
(1) "Essenoe* p. 35
(2) do. p. 37
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The traditional .Ena Realissimum la the *&od who is what the 
understanding t'links as the highest* (1). The God who gives 
the world reasonable meaning and saves it from aimless 
irrationality is si .ply the human belief in the rationality of 
the world. This might be summed up in the dramatic proposition: 
"The measure of thy God is trie measure of thy unde r standing* • (2)
It would be useful to ask at this point what relation this 
passage has to the uncovering of the contradictions and 
absurdities of theological metaphysics to be found in the third 
chapter of the second half of the bock. (5) In this passage 
Feuerbach discusses the contradiction involved in the various 
ideas of God, including the God of the human intellect. The 
first absurdity he has in mind is the conflict between the 
abstract being. “One half of the definition", he observes, "is 
always in contradiction with the other half", one statement 
annihilates the other (if). And what theologian has not known 
the unrest of this problem? A second example we will quote 
In full. He writes:
"A God who does not trouble himself about us, who 
does not hear our prayers, who does not see us and 
love us, is no God) thus humanity is made an essential 
predicate of God) - but at the same extent it is said:
A God who does not exist in and by himself, out of men, 
above men, as another being, is a phantomj and thus it 
is made an essential predicate of God that he is non- 
human and extra-human.” (5)
1) "Essence" P. 37
2) do. P. 39
5) do. P.213-
do. p.213
5) do. P.213
The question at stake here is, of course, the theology 
of symbol and analogy, the univocal and equivocal use of 
religious language, a problem we have discussed elsewhere. All 
affirmations must be negated and set against others which are also 
negated, or else a finite od is settled for. What is it, then, 
whieb makes theologians able to continue their work, and others - 
for example Feuerbach, * to conclude that G-od is as essentially 
human as the ideas men have of him so clearly are?
We might be tempted to answer this question immediately by 
pointing to faith or the •positive datuir.* which Max Scheler 
separates from the "finite non-divine or merely analogous" 
propositions of affirmative theology (l) For it would seem to 
be this basic experience of Sod which renders it impossible for 
some to take Feuerbach9s thought and make it their own. One 
suspects that it is not simply Feuerbach's shallow blindness to
evil and death that enables Barth to laugh in his face (2), it is
also his certainty that there is in his own theology no 
possibility of "an inversion of above and below, of heaven and 
earth, of (rod and man". Barth urges all theologians that the 
only answer to Feuerbach worth its stuff is one in which the whole 
line of the boundary of the relation between £od and man is "in 
principle uninvertible" (3). Barth sees that Lutheran theology, 
in which the "predicates of the divine majesty really belong to 
tke humanity of Jesus as such and in abstracto" (if), can lead, 
without Galvin's corrective, to a blurring of the distinction 
between iod and man. Hegel, and of course Feuerbach, exploited 
this interpretation. So his own theology took as its starting
dcheleri On the Sternal in Man. p*172
(2) Intro. Barth p. xxviii
(3) do. do. p. xxiii
(4) do. do. p. xxiii
point the "infinite qualitative distinction” between God and 
man so clearly understood by Kierkegaard (1), and he made it the 
pivot of his thaolo rioal work. (2) It was this first principle 
which led Barth to r epudiate the theology of the Analogia Kntis, 
and whleh continues to enable him to take Feuerbach with a 
seriousness that others must hesitate to do. (3) But what is 
the ground of his assurance? Can it be anything other than the 
"Assertio" of faith which Sbeling sees must take the responsibility 
for what is said of God, and is the only answer to the accusation 
of those who interpret it as "subjeotive caprice and pure 
illusion"? (4)
We see, then, that the same "absurdities" of conflicting 
ideas in the doctrine of the being of God can lead in two 
different directions, the way of the believing theologian and 
the way of the "natural philosopher in the realm of mind" (5)* We 
will not proceed with this problem at present (6) but before we 
continue with the God of morality and human emotion, we will glance 
at Feuerbach's study of Revelation in the second chapter of this 
second portion of the book. (oh.XXI pp.204^212). We can ot 
continue to attend to the problem of the being of God for faith 
without understanding Feuerbach's interpretation of revelation, 
nor can we see Barth's remarks in their rightful context, unless 
we can see their relation to this interpretation.
(1) Sbren I ierkegaard. Phil.F sgments, p«57/B - and in relation to 
Feuerbach p.56*
(2) Barth: Romans 1:18 p.44, also 47*98*108, &o. and The Humanity of 
God, p.37,20,26 on Feuerbach.
(3) Church ogmatics 1.1 Foreward pjt 
(4; Ebelingi Word and Faith, pp 346*7*
(jS "Essence" p. xxxiv
(6) We shall do so on p. Go of this chapter.
Feuerbach*s theology of revelation (oh.XXI p. 204-212) 
rests upon the thesis that; "Heligion is a dream, in which our 
own conceptions and emotions appear to us aa separate existences, 
beings out of ourselves", (1) Thus, for him, to believe in the 
revelation of Sod vas to believe in the Illusion that the 
subjective was •really* objective, that God was in himself 
other than man. Belief is naive personification of human 
thoughts, emotions and wishes; the projection of these into a 
false objectivity. Feuerbach outlihes the sohema of revelation 
as follows;
"Man can of himself know nothing of God; all his 
knowledge is marsly vain, earthly, human. ♦ ♦ .But God is 
a superhuman being; God is known only by himself, 
thus we know nothing of God beyond what he reveals to 
us. By means of revelation, therefore, we know God 
through himselfj for revelation is the Word of God - 
God declaring hlmsslf." (2)
He then raises the important question of communication 
between God and man, and asserts that God can only reveal what 
he must reveal if his revelation is to be for man and not for 
some other being. It is not, of course, that God is limited but 
that man is limited; and for God to work in relation to man, he 
must move within these limits. Thus Feuerbach continues:
"In the scheme of hi:? revelation, God must have 
reference not to himself, but to man#s power of 
comprehension. That which coses from God to man, 
comes to man only from ’man in God*, that is, only 
from the ideal nature of man to the phenomenal man, 
from the species to the individual. Thus between the 
divine revelation and the so-called human re -son or
!1) "Essenoe" p. 204 2) do. p. 206
nature, there is no other than an illusory 
distinction#" (1)
Feuerbach employs here the same argument with the same 
intorpre ta tion of the language of religious belief, as we saw 
him do when he drew attention to the absurdities of conflicting 
ideas of tod a few moments ago. In the context of revelation, 
his argument proceeds as follows: The understanding of man is
limited. God reveals what man cen understand, he is what he 
can say of himself within this limit. Since man can know 
nothing of God other than what God himself reveals, this 
revelation •for* man is a revelation *of* man to himself. "In 
revelation", he writes, ’man goes out of himself, in order, by 
a circuitous path to return to himself." (2) The similarity 
between this and the logic of the argument against the usual 
theological use of religious language is obvious. A univocal 
or literal understanding of all we say of God, and all that 
can be revealed to us of God by God, inevitably leads us to a 
human God. We have again arrived at the central point of the 
theological problems so acutely raised by Feuerbach. But we 
are not quite ready to formulate them definitively. (3)
If man contemplates his own nature in his imagination, and 
this is his God; one nd^ht ask how this affects man*s life, 
Feuerbach answers that it is clear that the power of the idea of 
the perfect nature of the human species upon man through his 
imagination has beneficial moral affects. (4) Such an idea 
contains, after all, the goal and purpose of human life, It is 
the image of as yet unrealised humanity. This brings us to the 
second of the Mysteries of human nature, falsely called mysteries
!1) "Sssenoe" p*207 2) do. p.20?
3) We will take this up again on p. Go 
4) "Essence" p.208
of the divine nature by theology. The moral being called 
God by Christian theology must have human attributes to be 
God, We shudder at the idea of the impersonal God, of the 
inhuman, immoral God. "Where thou givest rae God", wrote 
Luther, "thou must give me humanity too." (1)
In the passage we are now considering, (oh.HI p.44-49) 
Feuerbach notes that the "infinite, universal, non-anthropo- 
morphic being of the understanding" which he had disoussed 
previously (ch.Il) was only a "mathematical point of religion"
(2)5 it was not important for the essence of Christian faith 
itself* What is of absolute importance is the idea of the 
moral perfection of God which, for Feuerbach, is of course the 
aioril nature of man which the believer strives to posit as an 
absolute andindependent being. We do not feel we ourselves 
have to become the Omnipotent and Eternal being which is the 
idea of the God of the Understanding, but the idea of the God 
of moral perfection is a law for all men, a call to moral
action, a judgement of all that falls short of suoh perfection.
Feuerbach quotes Kant as saying that the moral law humiliates 
every man because it shows him up to be what he is, a sensual 
being* Christian faith, however, makes the moral law into 
the being of God, in the idea of God as judge; but just as man 
also loves and has mercy as well as knows what is wrong, so God 
too is loving and merciful. God is not inhuman in his attitude 
to sin; he acts as we should expect of him, in a human manner. 
Thus Feuerbach proceeds to show how his proposition "Homo homini 
deus est" can be found to be the essence of this as well as all
the other mysteries of Christian faith.
The oontradction between differing ideas of God which we 
have already considered when we looked at some passages from the
(1) "Essence" quoted p.45
(2) do. p. 44
59.
second portion of the book, car. now be seen to contribute 
to Idle form in which the idea of a moral divine being is 
criticised. "One half of the definition", wrote Feuerbach,
“is al.aye in contradiction with the other half" (1). The 
idea of God as a being of the understanding is the product 
of a process of theological abstraction! or perhaps more 
accurately, it is an attempt to avoid the demonic pitfalls of 
literal anthropomorphism. On the other hand, the idea of 
God as the moral being who both judges and loves, checks this 
attempt, and begins to find a way back to a human God. In 
this light, the two parts of the "Esse oe of Christianity" seem 
to be t\ If il-iing a complementary role in relation to each 
other. The Anthropology comes out quite clearly in the 
showing up of the contradictions, and the absurdities of 
conflicting ideas of Tod become clear in the Anthropology.
Both sections rest, however, upon theunivocal use and 
interpretation of God-language which Feuerbach naively assumes 
to be the only one which avoids complete scepticism and 
atheism. (2) It is to this central problem that we now turn.
But we shall come to it through a study of the Incarnation 
which Feuerbach turns tc his own purposes in a most interesting 
way. $7e saw that in his theology of revelation, God revealed
only human qualities within the limits of human understanding 
and language} God acted in a way man could understand and 
express. (of.p*5b) The Mystery of the Incarnation is the mystery 
of the Love of God, and the mystery of the loving God is simply 
the contemplation of G d as human. "The Incarnation is nothing 
else than th3 practical, material manifestation of the human 
nature of God", he writes. (3) Or again; "The idea of the
(1) "Essence" p.213. of. p.5
(2J do. p. 17
(3; do. p. 50
Incarnation is nothing more than the human form of a God, 
who already in his nature, in the profoundest depths of 
his soul, i3 a merciful and therefore a bun&n God.*(l)
A presupposition of these two passages is of much 
interest. All revelation is revelation for man, which seems 
to lead inevitably to a human content of revelation, if the 
language in which revelation is expressed is understood 
literally. It is this transition from the finite, human 
nature of the language of revelation to the father, and quite 
differentpoint, of a finite, human nature of the being who 
reveals himself in revelation, that we have been continually 
returning to in our discussion of the nature of revelation 
and of religious language. Indeed, it is thepivot around 
which the whole of Feuerbach’s understanding of the being of 
G-od revolves. We noted that the cboioe of two ways can be 
distinguished, one whioh is taken by the believing theologian 
who asserts that when he speaks of God it is of God that he 
speaks, and the other chosen by Feuerbach who suggested more 
potently than anyone else that when the believer speaks of God, 
it is of the nature of man that he is speaking. (2) When we 
studied the nature of religious language (3), we saw that 
Feuerbach ohose this course in three different contexts, that 
of theological epistemology, that of theologioal language, and 
that of ohristology. In the first he concluded that because 
man9 8 capacity to know man was intrinsically limited to the 
empirically knowable, and thus to finite reality, God w%s either
(1) "Essence" p.51
12) of. pss s<?
(5) Ch. on religious language. Chap .HI pp. 57-^1
finite and human or else completely unknowable. In the oase 
of theological language, he argued that either God was what we 
are able to say of him within the limits of our human 
language; or he is outside, or other than, what we say about 
him, in which oase we can neither know nor say what he is.
Or in the terms of Christology, which for Feuerbach meant an 
undialectioal interpretation of Lutheran christology, God 
exhaustively reveals himself in Christ. As far as we are 
concerned Christ as God pro nobis, the Incarnate God, is the 
only God that man can know or speak of. Thus all three oases 
are concluded in the proposition! Homo homini deus est.
We might draw attention at this point to two modes of 
theological reflection, both of which Feuerbach questions 
fundamentally. We have seen that Feuerbach draws the being
of God within the confines of human thought, emotion, morality
*
and language. But we also saw that God was these forms of 
human self-expression in their infinite aspirations, in their 
drive towards complete realization and absolute perfection.
Thus, God, or the various ideas of God, encountered in the 
relation of faith, is human nature stretched or extended beyond 
the limits of the individual in the intensity of the human 
attempt to transcend the confines of finitude. This mode of 
theological reflection begins with man but as Feuerbach so clearly 
shows, only apparently aspires from man to the infinite.
The second way of doing theology which Feuerbach also 
questions is that of a fully developed theology of revelation. 
Many have listened to him in the case of the former theological 
method, and have made it their own oriticism of most of 19th 
century liberal protestant theology. But few have noticed that 
Feuerbaoh threatens the great answer of our own time to s uch 
theology, with an equally potent question. We saw (p.Sb) that
Feuerbach understood revelation as a circuit which is in fact 
from man to man, but which appears to faith to be from 
outside man during the second half of the circuitous process.
(t) But it is not this rather too vague pictorial explanation 
of revelation which is of first importance. For we must lock 
closely at the problem of the language in which God reveals 
himself rather than anything else. This mode of theological 
reflection argues that however far the innate facilities of 
human nature are stretched, however much man may experience an 
internal drive towards self-transcendence, he will find only 
human Gods and not the God who himself freely chooses to reveal 
himself in his word. This would be in line with Feuerbach’s 
oritioism of theology starting from man. But ths language 
which is allegedly God speaking in his revelational word is 
human language. And to say as ^arth does, that God gives to 
human language, through his own grace, the eapacity to speak of 
himself, (2) is to leave Feuerbach’s question unanswered. It Is 
to fail to see that even if it is God who authenticates the use 
of such language, the language itself can a till lead unchecked to 
the God who is the self-transcendence of human nature. Barth 
tries to let God do the difficult job of justifying and 
explaining the language of revelation; bur fails because he does 
not see that his answer leaves the problem untouched, and that 
it is the responsibility of man to attend to it. To say this 
is not, of course, to exclude the priority of God in the relation 
of grace, nor to identity faith with some intrinsically human 
experience) but it is a refusal to evade the inevitable 
responsibility of man for what he says. The danger lurking 
behind Barth is that he has no way of checking whether he is not 
illegitimately calling in the name of God to authenticate a
(1) ’’Essence’ p.207
(2} Church dogmatics II 1 204-254# cf. esp. 213# 223# 233#
45, 228, 243f.
*3.
theological fashion which must one day die a healthy death.
Or else, the privilege of all users of theological language 
must henceforth be to speak, as Barth does, of the 
appropriateness of their language of reflation as being due 
solely to the Grace of God.
We shall hare to leave, however, the specific problems of 
particular theologians such as Barth, fully aware that to relate 
what Feuerbach has to say to Barth in a fair and balanced way 
would require a book in itself. The problem we do have to 
continue to give our attention to is that of the 
appropriateness of theological terminology. The theologian 
must face the question Feuerbach puts to him in his use of 
both ancient and modem ideas of God, and even every possible 
christological formula; Does what he says not refer to an 
exclusively human rather than a divine context? Does a 
dialectic of divine-human still have to be maintained? Or is 
the dialectic not rather between the ideal a nd the actual, between 
essential and existing man? Is the transcendence of God not a 
human transcendenoe, the transcendence of self which human 
nature achieves in the ideas of God which free him from the 
limited confines of his individual finitude? And recalling what 
we saw in the chapter on Anthropology, this transcendence is 
also bound up with the transcendence of the human other, the 
Thou who mediates the essenoe of human nature to me. (l) . All 
these questions rest upon the step which Feuerbach takes which 
leads him from the inevitably human situation in which the 
language of revelation must have meaning, to the unambiguous 
conclusion that the content of revelation, as well as the form,
(if we might use the old distinction for a moment), was after 
all thoroughly human.
( D  p zz-2.5^ particularly 2.^.
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These fascinating questions, the most difficult theology 
ever has to taokle, ought now to be a good deal dearer in 
our minds, and therefore we must continue with the task of 
expounding both parts of the book with them close to hand. So 
we turn from the Incarnation to the human mystery which is the 
essono8 of the suffering God. (l) Feuerbach formulates this 
in the sentence: "God as God is the sum of all human perfection;
God as Christ is the sum of all human misery.” (2) The self- 
sacrificing Love of the incarnate God in the suffering of the 
passion is the picture or image which satisfies the human need 
for meaning andpurpose in human suffering, and it therefore 
fulfils the drive to transcend the evil and despair of finite 
existence. Thus the mystery of the suffering God is the 
mystery of the suffering human heart. "God", he writes, "is 
the mirror of man" (3) - "Every man must place before himself a 
God, i.e. an aim, a purpose" (4), and in this God he will place 
what ultimately concerns him, and this he will do whether he begins 
from man and reaches God by extending in God what he cannot reach 
himself, or whether he Is blind to this, and is aware only of 
his God revealing what he needs God to reveal to him.
So far the various explanations of Christian beliefs and 
doctrines have not seemed too improbable, so as to require 
objection. But there are passages (5), in which theological 
doctrines are arbitrarily, even naively, forced into an anthro­
pological mould. At the beginning of the book the divine 
trinity was unoonvincingly reduced to the human trinity of the 
Kantian categories by means of which all psychological phenomena 
were classified: Season, Will and Affection (6). This analysis
(1) "Essence" p.5JM>5 (5) for Instance, "Essence" p.3
(2) do, p.59 (6) of Anthropology p.3 (Gh.Il)
(3) do, p.63
(4) do, p.64
$5#
la ocnaiiarably modified in tho chap tor cm tho Trinity which 
we shall look at next* (1) In this chapter specifically 
devoted to tho Trinity, tho explanation in Kantian torma is 
not ©©ployed. Instead, Fou bach reduces the int*r-trialtartan 
relations to human a el- -consol: usneas, which as we have soon (2) 
consists of an internal relation between I and another, tho Thou 
which is the s elf I know as myself* Thi solf is #objeotf to 
m  In «y own s elf-knowledge, and is not to be identified with 
is© subject or I which eludes all knowledge, since it is the 
I which knows. The triune God consists of the relation of 
solf-consctous»eas, "the *atfaer is I, the Son is Thou" , and the 
Holy Spirit is tho "bond of Love between Father and '.on”. (3)
The Logos is the idea of a being cons ruoted by thebuman 
1: agination as an image of itself, just as the abstract being 
of the i aaaon is constructed from the ooIf-transcending potentiality 
of the Intellect* The Logos shares with all ideas of God,
Including the Trinity, therefore, an intrinsically human 
os'ones (4)* These •explanations* of the Trinity, and tho 
Legos doctrines are undcubte ly las contrived than the 
psychological trinity noted above * The so-called
ooemogonicsl principle in od, which we oonsiler next (5) is the 
ingenious theory that the mediation of the Lamination between 
abstraction and pare© fcion, hot mon the conceptual and tho 
ocncrete, is the true essence of the theolo^ioal dogma of the 
mediation of the ogos, beteson God and world in erection*
It Is difficult to estimate tho value of such ingenuity* in 
abstract God and a concrete world are, to be euro, polar
(1) "Essence" pp.68-73
ca) of* oh. on Faith, §/l («h.I)
3J "Kssenoe" p* 67 and 70 
S) do* p. 74-79 
5) do# p. bQ-86
oppositesj but whether the imagination as mediator between 
the one and the other, can simply •explain* the Logos 
theology is doubtful. It is all a little too simple, 
though the underlying method of reduction does not stand or 
fall upon the success of such individual instances.
Tfe must now add to these questions one farther 
question arising from them. What doe3 the method of 
reduction stand or fall by? How are we to regard such a 
method? To answer this we must first ask again how far the 
analysis of contradictions and obscurities in the second 
part of the book provide the foundation for the Anthropology 
in the first. If we look at the chapter on the Contradiction 
in the Trinity (1) we see that the absurdities of trinitarian 
language bear no relation whatsoever to the anthropological 
reduction of the trinity we looked at above* Feuerbach*s 
argument is expressed as follows: "To require the reality
of the persons is to require the unreality of the unity, and 
conversely, to require the reality of the unity is to require 
the unreality of the persons." (2) His line in the 
anthropological interpretation passage was quite different* 
Instead of arguing that the three contradicted the one, and 
vice versa, he left numerical considerations alone, and 
proceeded to attempt to show that what Christians believed was 
a triune divine being was •really* something else. The method 
of reduction in this oase bears no relation to the unearthing 
of contradictions. What sort of considerations, therefore, 
are likely to clarify the nature of this method of reduction?
It undoubtedly rests upon some largely unquestioned
(1) "Essence" p*232 to 235
(2) do. p. 235
positivistic prs suppositions, which be cease clear when we 
indicated the limits which which knowledge and language were 
thought, by Feuerbach, to function (1). It is because the 
language of theology could not refer to what it purports to 
refer to, because man is confined in his knowing and his 
speaking to the experiencable world of physical nature, that 
the nethod of reduction can begin to be employed at all* If
the idea of God cannot be external to man, God must be 
understood to be an idea, an intelligible essence, a genetic 
Universal, a moral and loving principle, an abstraction of the 
intellect, and so on.
In the chapter on religious language we discussed
Feuerbach within the framework of a deliberate dichotomy (2),
Either God is what we can say about him, or he is in some 
sense other than what we can say of him. We found this rather 
rigid polar framework valuable in gaining a grip upon the 
problems before us, but is it a valid dichotomy in the wider 
context in which we now find ourselves? It posed the problem 
of the being of God in a crisp either/or fashion, which we 
will now have to oonsider more closely in relation to the 
presuppositions of the me hod of reduction outlined above, and 
to the chapter on the Existence of God. (3) Our problem is an 
ontological one: What kind of being is the being of God?
Feuerbach^ naturalism led him to a reductive thesis which makes 
this question split into a number of similar questions such ass 
What kind of being has the divine being of human morality? Or, 
What kind of being has the God who loves man by becoming man, 
or th# God who is coextensive with the intellectual ability of 
man to abstract and speculate? We are clearly coming at the
(1 ) e f . p . 4o- b'l
(2) of • p* of Chap .III on Religious Language.
(3) "Essence" ch.20, p*197-203*
ever-recurring question which Feuerbach raises for theology 
from a different angle, this time openly ontological rather 
than linguistic. We were seeking for a non-rsductive 
interpretation which also took seriously Feuerbach* s acute 
analysis of religious language. But we saw that this was a 
massive task that lies beyond our scope at present, (l)
We can, however, raise the questions involved in 
Feuerbach*s analysis of the obscurities and contradictions 
in the idea of the existenoe of God, and thus clarify the 
ontological question itself somewhat. The complexity we 
have before us consists, in part, in the tension between 
Feuerbach9s positivism and his willingness to embrace the 
aspiring s8If-transcending of finite limits which is the 
9es enoe9 of man9 a faith in G-od within his thought as well. 
Although the objectivity of God is broken down, it is done at 
the cost of maintaining a rather anti-naturalistic concept of 
essence, a universal category abstracted from the actual 
existence of man. We have already seen a great many of the 
difficulties involved in this. For example: the God of the 
so-called Proofs for the existence of God is the God of the 
Intellect} the Mid quo nihil majus cogitari potest* is the 
self-transcending drive of the Intellect atothe limits of 
abstraction and of thought} it is the fulfilment of itself 
in the conoept of the highest being. Here the leap from 
thought to being is made by the believer simpjy, as Feuerbach 
says, because **this highest being would not be the highest if 
he did not exist** (2) But the ontological argument reveals, 
according to Feuerbach, the externalising, objectifying, 
projecting process whereby God takes on an apparently distinct 
end independent existent?to the believer.
(1) of. p. of ch.III
(2; "Essence** p. 198. Also oh.I p."3t-»t-
69
Thus we can formulate the ontological question as 
follows: The kind of being ascribable to God is not, as 
theologioal and religious thinkers maintain, external 
existence; but is claasifyabl© in the same realm as an idea, 
a moral principle, a pioture of the imagination which depicts 
qualities which hare & Tory considerable beneficial effect upon 
the life of men* We cannot here consider the psychological 
aspect of the problem. But, for Feuerbach, the objectivity of 
God becomes as aspect of the subjective being of man: God has
the same sort of ontological status as the predicates which are 
ascribed to him when they are taken from God and applied 
exhaustively to the realm of human being in both its individual 
and social aspects. For it is in an anthropological ethic and a 
philosophical metaphysio, both human activities, that the once 
divine predicates are allowed to be what Feuerbach thinks they 
essentially are.
So much, then, for the being of God conceived as A being, 
an independent existent. But the theological and philosophical 
{even mythical) use of being-language is not so easily shattered. 
What if the assumption that because God was not to be found 
amongst beings he must be a mere idea or set of principles and 
moral qualities, (i,e, a subjective, psychic phenomenon), were 
not valid? Is there not a third way, and an ontologioal way 
at that? "God is something that must transcend being", wrote 
Keister Eckhart, "God acts at large above being, animating himself. 
He aots in uncreated essence. Before there was being, God was; 
and he is where there is no being. It would be as incorrect for 
me to call God a being as it would be to call the sun light or 
dark." (1)
(1) iokhart Sermon p.218-219 (of Harper ed. tr. Raymond Blakney)
Eckhart, nevertheless, proceeded to formulate a doctrine 
of God in terms of being. We see here the breaking up of 
the dichotomy which was set up in chapter H I  and questioned 
a moment age. (1) We have in many theologians a doctrine of 
God as 8eing, ESSE IPSUM, or CfJ ^  C*/ or jiUT o T o  O V
and such a doctrine offers a possible alternative to exclusive 
unknowable and inexpres ible transcend; nee and exhaustively 
anthr op ologica1 immanence. We have transcendence and immanence
in dialectical tension. The Otherness of God to all beings, 
all entities, leads us to speak of him in negatives, even as 
non-being or no-thing. But as the Being of beings, God is 
not relegated to the inaccessible heights of exclusive and 
unknowable transoendence. All things are seen as directly 
depending upon God for their being, though that does not mean 
that God is directly known in all things.
We have seen, in recent years, important attempts to arrive at 
ontology by means of an existential analysis of the being of 
human being. Feuerbach's critique of the theological attempts 
to speak of God in such a context can be derived from the 
principle behind the proposition: "The idea of deity coincides 
with the idea of humanity." (2) The prinoiple is that of 
inversion whereby the distinction between God pro nobis and God 
per se is denied; and the God pro nobis is understood to be the 
human transcending of finite limits in thought, imagination and 
moral yearning. Feuerbach's reductive inversion may be 
undertaken, therefore, at the point where the philosophical 
theologian professes to have ceased to speak of human existence 
alone, and to have begun talking of God, or Being, in relation 
to human existence.
(1) of. p.t7(Ch.W, thla Ch.)
(2) "Essence" p.152
There seems to be a kind of botSl&xy, extremely nebulous 
perhaps, which con be distinguished In ell the problems 
euorb&ch raises. This is the boundary,or limit,of what we 
know es our finite hua*n world, a boundary which is sometimes 
arbitrarily set up by philosophers at a certain fixed point, 
a boundary which is constantly in the process of being 
extended when new questions are asked in the light of which 
new aspects of reality are seen. But whatever the boundary 
is, (and we must fully admit the ambiguous nature of such a 
term), and wherever it is, we can see In these ontological 
doctrines of God as in uoh recent theology, a strong 
tendency to press God out beyond trie boundary in one way or 
another. Tills tendency has received recent and reported 
emphasis. God was not to be confused with finite reality, 
with the world, with men; God w. a other than all kncwable 
phenomena. God was independent of the world, though the world 
was dependent upon God. The really tricky question is how 
the world can be understood to depend on God, because in 
practice the problem has boon thought out in explicit 
relation to modem science, and the world has been given a 
Corresponding independence and autonomy to the sovereign 
independence of the wholly transcendent God. It has been in 
the paradoxical tension of faith that the two have been 
brought together.
In Feuerbach, we encounter the crucial question: How 
docs God stand in relation to man, and to t ha world?
Feuerbach gives a quite clear answer: All ideas of God are in 
essence human, and thus God can be understood to be t o 
essence of humanity known only through the I-Thou relation, 
since It is only through the human other than human 
consciousness of self arises, and to be human is to be a 
self-conscious being. The logic of this reaaoning has, as we 
have rpeatedly shewn, a queer turn. The problem we are facing
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is that raised by all talk of the infinite from a finite 
standpoint, all talk of transcendence from the human 
situation.
There seems to be a point, we hare called it, perhaps 
too ambiguously, a •boundary*, which all those who subject 
theological language to a negative critique must reach.
V. hen this point is reached, a number of theological 
alternatives are open, all of which are an answer to the 
limiting halting-point of the boundary. A theology of 
revelation can be constructed, or a persisting way of negation 
which proceeds to point to God by artioulating what he is not, 
or there is Feuerbach’s answer. He does not conclude that 
because our ideas of God are found to be inadequate, God 
must be other than what we say of him, that is, beyond the 
boundary 1 but he r eturas to the human situation and refuses to 
think in any other than human terms. Thus he avoids, in the 
last analysis, the seriousness which leads man to the boundary. 
He evades the insistent questions which arise out of human 
existence and which cannot of necessity be answered by 
recourse to the human situation. He has, nevertheless, 
recognized the first stage in the movement of self-transcendence} 
though he returns unambiguously, or from the point of view of 
the theological answer to such questions, unparadoxically, to 
the sphere of human existence.
In the light of such considerations, it would seem that 
to persist in asking the question of God is the truly 
theological answer to Feuerbach, who does not do so. He has 
settled for an unproblematic God who is easily understood and 
spoken about beoause he is nothing other than the peaks of 
all the various aspeots of human endeavour. Although Feuerbach
remains notably unclear in informing us of the 
ontological status of his idea of God as essence of 
humanity, it is certain that it is to be derived 
exhaustively from the immanent sphere of the human world 
and not from any possible transcendence of the limits of 
this finite context. He turns away, so to speak, from 
the boundary.
It is in the asking of the question of God, rather 
than in any formulation of both question and answer within 
a theological system, essential t ough the latter must 
always be, that we detect the difference between Feuerbach 
and those theologians, who have grasped the situation in 
which we find ourselves, but have continued to do theology 
rather then anthropology. Expression of the theology of 
transcendence,which is involved here^is always provisional 
and impermanent, but the question of transcendence must still 
be asked if theology is to remain theology, Feuabaoh has 
shown us that if God is related immediately and 
unparadoxically to man, it is only a matter of time before 
man recognizes that he is looking at himself in a mirror, 
except that the reflection has tendencies towards infinity, 
omnipotence and so on. On the other hand, the theologies 
of the transcendence of God which have, in our own time, 
been formulated in reaction to this, seem to leave the world 
in a position of the same sovereign independence from God as 
is ascribed to God from the world. The question of a 
middle way cannot be dismissed, but it is clear that no 
theology can avoid the tension of these two poles. The 
situation in contemporaiy theology can be understood only in 
the light of such considerations. The question of the 
expandability of God is raised for both polar positions, 
Feuerbach* s because there is no need to use the term God for
simply human realities, eren for human self-transcendence in 
any of its many forms, and in the second case, because the 
world can stand on its own in autonomous independence of the 
God on whom it was for oonturies thought to depend.
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We now turn to the last aspect of our analysis, 
the anthropological ethio in which the being of God is 
understood as love. We have already given a basic 
presentation of the anthropology, and we are familiar 
with the important problems. It therefore remains to 
us only to formulate criticisms of what we discussed* 
Such criticisms were postponed in the Chapter on 
Anthropology for the sake of clarity, but at the cost 
of sounding somewhat naively uncritical. We will 
look at these now*
We have the core of those criticisms whioji must be made 
of Feuerbach* • Anthropological sketches, reduced from the 
doctrines of Christian theology, in an essay written in London 
in 1888 by Frederick Bngels (1), entitled HLudwig Feuerbach and 
the end of Classical German Philosophy". Writing in 1888, 
Bngels looks back over forty years and notes that "to Feuerbach, 
who after all in many respects forms an intermediate link 
between Hegelian philosophy and our conception, we never 
returned.” (2) ”A full acknowledgement", he continues, "of 
the influence whioh Feuerbach, more than any other post Hegelian 
philosopher, had upon us during our period of storm and stress, 
appeared to me to be an undischarged debt of honour*" (3)
(1) Marx and Engels *0n Religion* pp.213 to 268
(2) Ibid p.213
(3) Ibid p.214
Marx had written his well-known eleven "Theses on Feuerbach" 
in 1845» which w^re simply notes "hurriedly scribbled down 
for later elaboration", as Engels tells us, "absolutely not 
intended for publication but invaluable as the first 
document in whieh is deposited the brilliant gem of the new 
world outlook*" (1)
In these theses Marx made certain criticisms of 
Feuerbach, later modified and filled out in the 
substantial essay by Bngels, which ara well worth close 
study. Theses Nos. IV, VI and XI require our special 
atte tionj Thesis No. IV draws attention to the religious 
self-alienation which splits ths world into two, the real 
one and the religious, imaginary one. Feuerbach's work, 
writes Marx,
"consists of the dissolution of the religious 
world into its secular basis.••.The fact that 
the secular foundation detaches itself from 
itself and establishes itself in the clouds as 
an independent realm is really' only to be 
explained by the self-cleavage and self- 
contradictoriness of this secular basis. The 
latter must itself therefore, first be understood 
in its contradiction, and then revolutionised in 
practice by the removal of the contradiction." (2)
Thus Feuerbach is criticised by Marx first because he 
fails to take the contradiction in the secular world seriously 
enough and second because he fails to do anything practical 
about it. Thesis XI runs "The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is 
to change it". We must bear both these criticisms in mind.
flj Marx and Engels "On Religion" p.214
(2) Ibid. p.70
We have noted already the ambiguities in Feuerbach's 
concept of God as essence of humanity. Thesis No* VI 
makes all the nooessary critical points which must be made, short 
though it is. We shall quote it in full.
"Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into 
the human essence* But the human essence is no 
abstraction inherent in each single individual*
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social 
relations*
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism 
of this real essence, is consequently compelled:
1. To abstract from the historical process and 
to fix the religious sentiment as something by 
itself and to presuppose an abstract - isolated - 
human individual.
2* The human essence, therefore, can with him be 
comprehended only es 'genus1, as an internal, 
dumb generality which merely naturally unites 
the many individuals".
We have, in Marx's short but acute analysis of 
Feuerbach in Thesis Nos* IV and VI, the broad spectrum of 
the discussion which follows. We shall proceed from Thesis 
No.VI just quoted, and raise the question of Feuerbach's 
concept of man, his idea of the essence of humanity, the 
notion of genus or species} all of which we have already 
encountered, and all of which have puazled us in their 
obscurity. Marx has laid his finger on the weak point of 
Feuerbach* s position, and it is our task to clarify this point 
as far as we can. We shall then move to the subject of 
Thesis No* IV, the conflict within the seoular world.
The kernel of Marx's criticism Is that Feuerbach's 
conoept of man is too abstract , isolated, and general to 
be of any use in the study of man in the secular world.
In other words, Feuerbach employs on understanding of man 
which although it is indeed reduced from theology, is 
nevertheless ill•equipped to cope with the real world of 
human society because it has not been reduced enough. Engels 
approaches this in another way. He refers to a strong 
remnant of Idealism in Feuerbach's philosophy. Where 
religion based the truth of its ethic of love upon "the 
Crods - the fantastic mirror images of human qualities**, writes 
Engels, Feuerbach's anthropological ethic finds its truth 
"directly and without any mediation in the love between I and 
Thou." (l) Engels continues a few lines later:
"Feuerbach's Idealism consists here in this: he 
does not simply accept mutual relations based on 
reciprocal inclination between human beings, such 
as sex love, friendship, oompassion, self-sacrifice, 
etc. as what they are in themselves; but instead he 
asserts that they will attain their full valu8 only 
when consecrated by the name of religion." (2)
Whilst it is true that some passages in the chapter we are 
considering especially at present (ch.XXVXI) do include 
tliis assertion, Engels fails to see the other side of 
Feuerbach at this point, the side which takes his materialism 
consistently to its conclusion* (3) We need not go over this 
question again, however. Feuerbach brings "The Essence of 
Christianity" to a close with a passage which does speak of 
all inter-human relations as per se religious, and we would
(1) Engels: Feuerbach and the end of Classical G-eiman Philosophy: 
in *0n Religion' p.238 
(2} Ibid. p.238-9
(3; This tension was pointed out in Ch.II p.zq
bo clearer about what this means if we analysed this 
‘per sel All the morl relations are only moral when 
they are regarded as "sacred in themselves* (1)j they are 
moral not for the sake of any external principle or 
divine being, but for the sake of their own intrinsic 
worth. We have obviously reduced all theological ethic 
here to a straightforward anthropological one, but we still 
have to talk of such relations as •religious' or 'sacred'. 
Indeed, we may still speak of God just as long as it is of 
the essence of the human species that we are speaking.
Engel*s questioning of the use of such terms in this 
secular context is quite justified. He writes: "Sex love 
and the intercourse between the sexes is apotheosized to a 
religion, merely in order that the word religion, which is 
so dear to idealistic memories, may not disappear from the 
language," (2) I think it more likely that the term God be 
conserved for these reasons than the term religion; 
nevertheless, such a criticism can be extended far beyond 
Feuerbach to all theologians who unconsciously or uncritically 
employ the method of apotheosis in their theology, which may 
not be quite all theologians.
Engel's criticism is best expressed, however, when he 
says: "Feuerba^ ’who on every page preaches sensuousness, 
absorption in the concrete, in actuality, becomes thoroughly 
abstract as soon as he begins to talk of any relations other 
than mere sex relations between human beings," (3) It is not
(1) "Essence" p.2?1
(2) Engels: Ibid p.239
(3) do. Ibid p.241
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so muoh his attachment to religious or theological terms 
mentioned above, that is important for os, as his 
continuing U3e of an abstract concept of man* Feuerbach 
remains a pupil of Hegel, he is unable to break completely 
frea from Hegel when he attempts to speak ef concrete 
buma.. relations; he still sees them in terms of self- 
consciousness and bases the epistautology accompanying the 
theory of the essence of man on a basically Hegelian 
foundation, (l) This question is more clearly defined when 
we analyse, once again, the anthropological essence known as 
God, this time recasting our discussion in sympathy with 
our present aims.
Fe noted in concluding cur study (2), that there were 
three distinct ideas involved in the decidedly unclear 
use of the term essence of the species made by Feuerbach.
The essential nature of man knowable as the self of self- 
consciousness was clearly distinguishable from t he aggregate 
of all human qualities, the sum of all that mankind can 
attain,but the individual fails to attain. This again can 
be distinguished from the idea of essence as ideal in the 
non«*philosophio&l sense, that which man would like to be, or 
wishes he could be in the dreams or illusions of faith.
The only possible conclusion one can draw from this 
ambiguous state of affairs is that no one answer to the
question of Feuerbach*s philosophical position oan be made. 
Sometimes he subscribes to a kind of naturalism, repudiating 
the Hegelian concept of essence; at others, he employs the
(1) cf. Ch.I pp. ? and W-M 
(z) Ch.H p. 1*7 and I*-'?.
81.
Hegelian philosophy, especially Keel’s study of self- 
consciousness, to explain the subjective nature of faith and 
God as the object of faith. His naturalistic concept of 
srooies or genus, whioh Mara called an "internal, dumb 
generality** (1), is of little use in explaining the being of 
Godj and this, no doubt, was one reason Feuerbach had to 
resort to a richer ast of ideas.
The idea that God is what man would like to be finds an 
intermediary position in Feuerbach's understanding of 
christology, faith, -miracle and providence. This sense of 
ideal essence, the third one in the analysis outlined above, 
becomes actual in the existence of the person of Christ.
Christ does all the things man dreams of doing, but cannot do, 
because he, unlike Christ, is bound to the laws of cause and 
effect in the natural world. In the chapter on the mystery 
of Prayer (Part I. oh.XIl), Feuerbach understands prayer as 
the negation of the ordinary limitations of the finite world, 
and the absolutizing of his own wishes. "Cod satisfies our 
wishes, our emotional wants", he writes, "He is himself the 
realised wish of the heart..•.God is the nature of human 
feeling, unlimited, pure feeling, made objective.** (2)
Miracle is the suspension of the laws of nature in answer to 
the personal needs of man (3). Providence expresses the 
value of man as over against natural things, it is a form of 
self-love bought at the cost of a devaluation of external 
things. (4) The belief in personal immortality has a similar 
motive (5), as has the doctrine of the resurrection (6), and 
the idea of heaven. (7)*
Ibid. p.?1 (6J "iSssence" pp.135-139
"Essence" pp.121-3 
do. pp .1 <33—154
(4) do. pp.101-111
(5) do. p.105
do. pp.170-184
The weakness in such a theory is its inability to 
cope with the negative side of man's psychologic 1 life; 
because familiarity with later psychological analyses of 
the idea of God reveal that there is a reverse or dark 
side of God as a being of the psyche, only partially 
expressed in the projection of evil in men onto a devil. 
Perhaps Feuerbach's theory could be reformulated so that 
God may be understood as a complete reflection of the whole 
human psyche, with not only its wishes but also its negative, 
destructive aspects mirrored faithfullt in a deified form.
How Feuerbach could possibly identify this idea of a 
wish-fulfilling God, corresponding to all that man was not, 
with the idea of God derived from the aggregate of all 
mankind taken as a whole, i3 difficult to imagine. And again, 
the self which X am aware of as myself, which is the object 
of the Ego's knowledge in self-conscicusness, is obviously 
an idea of God from a totally different, philosophical 
context. It enables Feuerbach to agree with Augustine that 
God is more immediately known, by us than objects of the 
physioal, natural world. (1); but it involves him in a 
difficult philosophical line of thought largely foreign to 
the purpose of his work.
What have these three ideas in common? All three 
share in a fundamental lack of openness towards any non­
human, transcendent otherness, but to notice this at this 
stage in our atudy will hardly surprise us. All three 
contain the implication, on the other hand, of self­
transcendence, whether it be the individual transcending 
himself in his self-conscious awareness, or in his idea of
(1) "Essence" p.12
God as Essence of man, and his idea of God derived from a 
general estimate of all possible qu.jL-i.ties and possibilities 
existing in the concrete human, community, past and present. 
But the lack of open-ness referred to above has its own 
methodological significance. It is no fruitless 
negativism, but any, indeed, be said to be one of the 
pivots around which theology lias since revolved. It leads 
us now to the main subject of this ohapter, Feuerbaoh*s 
Ethic of Love.
In what follows, we shall 3ee that thesis No. XV of 
llarx's eleven theses on Feuerbaoh, together with Engel's 
useful elaboration, gives us the starting point for an 
understanding of feuerbaoh's Anthropology, and particularly 
its central concept; Love. We will pick this subject up, 
however, by drawing attention to part of thesis No. VI on the 
idea of the human essence, where Marx criticised Feuerbach's 
concept of man because it was an abstraction from the 
historical process, isolated and individualistic. This 
point emerges in another form in Marx's criticism of 
Feuerbaoh's failure to take the f? so If-cleavage and self- 
oontradiotoriness" of the secular world seriously, (l).
Thus we can begin to see quite clearly the close relation 
between the tensions within Feuerbach's idea of God as the 
essence of man, andhis ’understanding of the world.
There is still enough blatant evasion of serious 
involvement in, and commitment to,the world in Christian 
life and thought, for us to hesitate to understand Feuerbaoh
(l) On Religion, p.70.
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in terms of the following estimate of Engels: "Already
it becomes evident how fhr today we have moved beyond 
Feuerbach. Vis 'finest passages' in glorification of 
his new religion of Love are totally unreadable today." (1) 
Feuerbach's movement towards the world, his acceptance of 
the concrete human situation of interpersonal relationship 
as being of primary importance, all evoke a sense of relief 
if one oomes to them after much Christian Dogmatic. On 
the other hand, Engels here indicates where we can, and 
must, be severely critical, and that is of Feuerbach's 
naive optimism and blind disregard for most of what we 
know to be human. Engels expressed his criticism as 
follows: "Feuerbach who on every page preaches
sensuousness, absorption in the concrete; in actuality 
becomes thoroughly abstract as soon as he begins to talk 
of any relations other than mere sex relations between 
human beings." (2) Engels notes also Feuerbach's 
astonishing poverty when compared with Hegel in the 
question of morality. The form of Hegel's moral philosophy 
is idealistic but the content realistic; for Hegel includes 
much concrete material such as law, economics and politios. 
But Feuerbach, though his fora is realistic in that he 
starts from man; his content is mere abstract formality, 
there is "absolutely no menticn of the world in which this 
man lives."
"He appears just as shallow", continues Engels, "in 
comparison with Hegel, in his treatment of the antithesis 
of good and evil".(3) We have already noted Barth making
Engels: On Religion p.241
(2) do. do. p.241
(3) do. do. p.242
a similar criticism: "The root of Feuerbach's
shallowness" is for Barth that he was a "true child of 
his century," a "non-knower of death", and a "mi3knower 
of evil", (l) The question we have to consider is 
whether such criticisms are justified, and whether the 
limitations they imply to the value of Feuerbaoh's work 
substantially threaten the main purpose of his anti- 
theological thesis.
There is perhaps no need to re-quote the passages we 
have already studied earlier, in order to be able to say 
that Feuerbach's ethic of love, although it is moving in the 
right direction, has not encountered the real world of 
Illusion, misunderstanding, and conflict. We have no mention 
whatever of the problematic nature of loving in human life; 
on the contrary, he persistently offers us Love as the answer 
to all the needs, wishes, frustrations and sense of 
limitation which were once the starting point, from the human 
side, of the journey from Hod to man, and man to &bd.
Feuerbach stops short of the concrete situation which is the 
only context within which the ethic of Love can be worked 
out. His I-Thou philosophy is thus left poised above the 
world, isolated from the problematic nature of both the life 
of the individual and man's historical existence in community.
Marx's criticism in Thesis No. IV was that Feuerbach took 
no account of the contradictions in the secular world, that he 
was blind to the importance of the cleavage revealed in the 
developments of histoiy. In theological terms, Feuerbach 
fails to take evil seriously. In the sphere to which he does 
give attention, that of interpersonal, or I-Thou, relations; 
he again fails to see the complexity of the subject matter.
(l) Barth: Intro, to Essence p.xxviii quoted from Hans Ehreriberg: 
Die Philosophic der Zukungt. p.94
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He doe8 not take account of the fact that no amount of urgent 
exhortation to lore without reserration will make love possible 
in an actual existing situation. Human relations involve a 
complex conflict of worlds, of ways of seeing things, so that 
there can be no easy claim that how things seem is how they 
really are. Human being is not an unambiguous, straight­
forward being, and neither is love between human beings. In 
theological terms, again, Feuerbach fails to grasp any of 
the hard, distorted problems which must be raised when man*a 
inability to lore is fully taken seriously - as seriously 
as the true possibility of loving. He is blind to the 
existence of evil. We cannot, however, undertake the 
task of a deeper understanding of these problems in this 
work, although it is a task which must soon be undertaken in 
the present situation of contemporary thought.
It is important, however, to make it quite clear that 
although Feuerbach continues to employ certain abstractions, 
these are well on the way to becoming concrete,torbecoming:, 
concepts that may be worked into an understanding of reality 
rather than some super-reality. It may also be said that 
Feuerbach's materialism be rs the distinct marks of this 
transitional state in which he is precariously balanced. His 
concept of 'essence of the species* has shows to us the full 
ambiguity of his position. (1) And now his idea of love has 
manifested both a movement towards, and a recoiling from, a 
thinking which is completely involved in the historical and 
interpersonal affairs of the world. He fails to take hold of 
the sub jeot-matter of human e xistonce because in the
(1) oh.V. p. <?c and ch.II p. zv.
naturalistic side of his thought, his basic concepts are 
formulated in such away as to result in his being unable 
to comprehend the world of human being without certain 
naturalistic abstractions, such as, above alls 'species* 
or 'genus'. And such abstractions have only a limited 
functional significance; they do not complete our under­
standing of man. On the contrary, they lay Feuerbach open 
to a possible natur listic reductionism which would 
completely defeat the purpose of his reduction of theology 
to anthropology, of God to the reality of existing man.
For a naturalistic reduction would simply lay him open to 
yet another evasion of the truly human; this time, however, 
the abstraction would be naturalistic rather than theological.
We may justifiably oonolude, therefore, that the form 
whioh Feuerbach's philosophical presuppositions took, were 
much more of a liability to him than a help. The value of 
what he has to soy will stand independently of, indeed, in 
spite of his philosophical foundation.
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Our final task is to work tow ids some conclusions, in 
•pita of tha fact that in tha present state of contemporary 
theological study, no satisfactory solutions to the problems 
we have raised will be possible. Feuerbaoh is worth 
studying precisely because his problems arc very much ours 
again today. Thus to attempt solutions would be to call to a 
prematura halt a development of large proportions end 
considerable interest. Instead, we shall take a close look 
at sons of the most decisive points that have bean made in 
the course of this thesis.
1 • The first question we must clarify may be indicated 
in tha following proposition:
God for me is God shaped to my needs; God as He 
is revealed to man is essentially human because 
man is the criterion and yardstick of what is and 
what is not comprehensible, and therefore man 
determines the God who is revealed to him. "God 
is the mirror of man”, hones "all the predicates, 
all the attributes of the Divine Being are 
fundamontally human." 0).
The line of argument wo shall consider first is that 
which reve ls tbs extreme queationability of rauoh of the 
kind of theology which o entres its oonoem upon the existence
of man, and which comes to speak of God only by way of man's 
need for forgiveness and grace. X have in mind the doctrine
(1) "Essence” pp 63 and 222
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of God as tLvcxL qjotv , as deus pro nobis, and the 
Lutheran emphasis in Protestant dogmatics. Feuerbaoh 
sees the danger of an unqualified Lutheranism, and exploits 
such propositions as "Apart from Christ there is no God, and 
where Christ is, there is the whole Godhead”. Luther (1), 
to unearth the basic tenets of any ohristian doctrine of 
God. I will quote a brief example of his argument, and 
then elaborate its significance.
"If God is a living, i.e. real God, is God in
general only in virtue of this, that HS IS A GOD TO MAN,
a being who is useful, good, beneficent to manj then, 
in truth, man is the criterion, the measure of God, 
man is the absolute divine being.” (2)
Feuerbaoh proceeds by accepting, for reasons whioh will 
enable him to build a firm foundation for his theory of 
theologioal reduetionism, the traditional refusal to speak 
of God as He is in himself, except insofar as this is
obliquely revealed to us in God’s being for us in his acts. (3)
His argument, then, is that God becomes proportionally more 
like a human being as his loving concern for man increases.
God empties his divinity in the gift of himself in communication 
with man, God becomes man in the reaching out of himself in his 
acts towards man in the worldly situation of his actual 
existence. Man becomes the criterion, the norm beside which 
the divinity of God as he comes to meet man’s need, is 
measured. Our fear, today, of false objectification of God 
in our doctrine of God, meets, at this point, Feuerbach's 
quite different approach, in whioh the objectivity of God is 
understood as sheer illusion! and instead of avoiding one kind
quoted p.337 Of "Essenoe" from Luther Th.XlX p.403,
(2) "Essence" p*338 
(3; do. p. 16
of bad thinking, we are faced with a crucial dilemma.
How is God to be known obliquely In the worldly And the 
human, rather than directly above or beyond the world as 
some kind of metaphysical entity, and still be God, 
distinguishable as God, in sovereign independence from the 
worldly and the human? Faith's paradoxical knowing and 
not-knowing is sharply clarified in that it clearly does 
not think that it is identifying God with the hixnan, 
neither that it is claiming that God can be known directly 
in isolation from the hianan. Theology oan never live in 
separation from anthropology, we oannot speak of God as 
though we did not exist, as though it were not as men that 
we spoke of God. But does that mean that man and not God 
is the criterion of what is divine and what is not? The 
question of oriterion is the central question of theology, 
and we are not, here, responsible for working out a 
contemporary formulation of it. Feuerbach draws our 
attention, with almost prophetic insistence, to the human 
in our idea of the deus revelatus, and he tells us that when 
we 3peak of God as he is for us in his revelatory acts, we 
speak simply of the human.
The problem of the dark background, the existence of 
which is affirmed, though not of course known, in some 
theological assertions of the aseity or independence of God, 
has already been discussed (1). We need say here only that 
Christian faith itself persists in threatening such defence 
reactions against Feuerbach's onslaught, in the doctrine of 
the incarnation. However much we may affirm the separate 
existence of God in absolute distinction from man, the central 
event of tod's drawing near to man, in himself becoming man 
for man, returns us to the point of crucial uncertainty.
(1) "Essence" p.5zs c-y- p3b-*r.
2. The doctrines of the Imago del and the Analogic entis:
Secondly, we learn that all assertion of likeness 
between God and man is rendered questionable and problematic, 
unless the reduction of theological propositions to 
anthropological ones can be shown to be illegitimate. Thus 
the uncertainty noted above causes immediate reverbera.ions 
in the doctrines of the Imago dei and the Ahalogia entis.
We cannot go deeply into either of these doctrines at this 
stage} we must simply indicate the point where Feuerbach's 
questions come home. We read in the Sunana Theologies 
(Qu .XCIII Art.1), for instance;
"It is manifest that in man there is some likeness to 
God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this 
likeness is not one of equality for such an exemplar 
infinitely exoels its copy. Iherefore there is in 
man a likeness to God, not, indeed, a perfect likeness, 
but imperfect
Aquinas, here, asserts the doctrine of the imago dei, 
and at the same time tides to hold the divine and the human 
apart on the basis of the infinite perfection of God in 
contrast to the imperfection of man. Many theologians have 
thrown great emphasis upon the doctrine of the fall and the 
radioal sinfulness of man for the same reason. This would 
be one kind of defence against Feuerbach's impending threat; 
but there is no doubt that Feuerbach has his answer to this. 
Man's sin, his imperfect nature is simply the doctrinal 
formulation of his feeling of alienation from, and imperfection 
in contrast to, the infinite potentiality of the species. 
Between what man essentially is, and what he actually is, 
there is a wide and prominent gully; and when man comes to 
know God as the perfect essence of humanity, he feels both
separation and imperfection veiy strongly. Thus we 
cannot disarm Feuerbach so easily at this point.
Feuerbaoh links the Imago dei to the revelation of God 
as personal, which appears to us to be the revelation of a 
being distinct from man and in sharp contrast to man’s 
imperfect being. But both man and God participate in the 
idea of personality. The kinship between God and man, 
which Feuerbach admits to be a vague expression, is 
articulated in Christian theology in terms of the personal, 
in terms of Father and child. "The idea of man being the 
image of God reduces itself", writes Feuerbach, "to kinship; 
man is like God because he is the child of God." (i) Man 
resembles God as child to father, he is created in the 
image of God • (Gent 1t26. Col.1:15. I John 3:2 do.) He 
is in some way like God; and the fundamental theological 
question of the priority of God or man emerges. The idea 
of personality as a theological category is used both of 
God and man; it may be used im such a way that to speak of 
God as person can be the best way of artioul&ting his self- 
subsistence and the dependence of man upon him; it may be 
used so that the idea of personality, as an essential category 
of human being, is derived first from man and then projected 
into infinity, so that God is dependent on man*
The doctrine of Analogla entis raises similar questions 
from a different angle, ffe cannot, here, go into the 
complicated analysis of different kinds of analogy whioh Aquinas
(1) "Essence" p.224
can offer us (Summa Theol. Qu.IV art.3) I it is suffioient 
to show that to speak of crea ed things and their "Likeness” 
to God is to open a way, though not necessarily a smooth 
one, between the finite and the infinite, "The same things", 
wrote Pseudo Dionysius, "can be like and unlike to God: like 
according as they imitate him, as far as He, who is not 
imitable perfectly, can be imitated; unlike according as they 
fall short of their cause." (l) The created can be like God, 
but not God like the created. Aquinas answers the objection, 
which might have been Feuerbach's, that if any creature is 
like God, God willbe like some creature. He trios to ensure 
that the doctrine of analogy is not turned upside down, so 
that God's likeness to man is derived from man, by quoting 
Dionysius who said that: "A mutual likeness may be found
between things of the same order, but not between a cause 
and that which is o&used." (2) and he adds: "We say that a 
statue is like a man; but not conversely. So also a creature 
can be spoken of as in some way like God, but not that God is 
like a creature," Aquinas fails to take the objection 
seriously because he simply presupposes the priority of God 
as Cause, he presupposes, that is, that it is God from whom 
man is copied a? the statue from the real thing, and not man 
from whom God is copied*!* taka* for granted what ho is 
responsible for proving.
Barth has drawn a definitive line through this problem, 
as is well known. Indeed, he answers Feuerbach definitely and 
explicitly in many passages, and almost everything he writes
1) De Div.Ncm. X:7. Quoted Sisama Theol. QU.IV art.3*
2) do. IX:6. do. do. Reply 0bj*4 Art.3*
bears an implicit relation to Feuerbach. There is no need 
to quote the ©ft-qucted passage in whioh the Analogia 
JSntis is called the invention of Anti-Christ (l)| of more 
use to us here is the way Barth deals with such categories 
as Lord, Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer. "We possess", 
he writes, "no analogy on the basis of whioh the nature 
and being of Cod as the Lord can be accessible to us*... It 
is not the case that we have only to extend our idea of Lord 
and Lordship into the infinite and absolute to finally arrive 
at Cod the Lord and his Lordship"...."it is in consequence 
of Cod#s revelation alone" that we come to know Cod as Lord.(2) 
Similarly, we come to know Cod as Creator, Reconciler and 
Redeemer, indeed all the divine predicates, only from 
revelation, emphatically not from an extension of the finite 
into the infinite. Therefore, there is no basis at all for 
the Analogia Intis, neither is t lie re any doubt in our minds 
that Barth has decided the question of priority in favour of 
Cod.
Feuerbach answered Barth when he continued to ask his 
questions even when he was considering these categories as 
revealed, as the revelation of God to man, and not man*a 
extension of aspects of his own existence into the infinite.
To answer that the predicates of Cod are revealed in Jesus 
Christ, and that nothing man can either do or think will ever 
lead him to Cod, is to begin unreservedly with the priority 
of Cod. Barth does this, though in a way which takes 
Feuerbach's objection far more seriously than Aquinas was able to 
do. He does it, and therefore, fro® our point of view, evades
(*0 Barth. Churoh Dogmatics 1*1 p.X
(2) do. do. do. 11*1 p.75ff*
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the question. To say that God in his revelation is the 
criterion of what is and what is not truly God in his 
revelation is an attractively powerful, but ultimately 
fruitless argument, at least in relation to 51eunrbaoh,s 
radical question. It is circular, and evokes in us the 
appropriate response of submission before God which is 
appropriate to God if he is God. If he is not, but is an 
illusion, a projected image of essential humanity, a psychic 
archetype or such-like, then all our appropriate responses 
are in vain. Feuerbach^s perturbing questions still stand; 
and are not, as Barth implies, qua tions directed only to 
the theology of his own day. (1) A proposition like the 
following: "Men first unconsciously and involuntarily
oreates God in his own linage, and after this God consciously 
and voluntarily creates man in his own image;....for 
revelation is the self-unfolding of human nature" (2) remains 
a hard question to the theologian, and one whioh he cannot 
bvade by recourse to revelation.
3* Atheism and i.ihilism:
The issue of atheism, and the tendency towards nihil 3 ^  
is one which, once having defined our terms, will prove a 
useful starting point for discussion, just as long as we 
don*t sink to a mere discussion of labels. Feuerbach does 
not employ these terms, but the issues they denote concern 
us in our understanding of Feuerbach, considerably. Atheism 
is a very loose term whioh can mean any kind of negation of,
Barth. Intro, to "Essence" p.XIX 
(2; "Essence" p.118
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or denial of God, It can be a me t hodol o gic &1 exclusion 
of God, or it oan be an existential denial of God; it is 
also necessaxy to emphasize that every kind of atheism 
depends upon the kind of God denied or negated. Our 
purpose is not to decide whether Feuerbach was an atheist or not. 
He obviously denied the objectivity of God, but affirmed the 
subjectivity, or human nature of God. The issue involved has 
much more t o do with nihilism, for though Feuerbach was in 
no sense a nihilist, he nevertheless participated in the 
same climate of thought to which Nietzsche's philosophy was 
such a powerful response. There is no doubt that he did so 
with far less insight and far leas daring, and he did not 
grasp the kind of radical!ty which led Nietzsche's madman to 
cry: "God is dead!*
Feuerbach's reduction of the transcendent God to the 
transoendent essence of the human species left him with a kind 
of norm or value with which he could pass judgemeat upon the 
eotual concrete situation of man in t he world. He did not 
have to establish values in total separation from any 
transoendent or supernatural authority or criterion as Nietzsche 
tried to do. Thus he never really grappled with nihilism, nor 
with a truly existential atheism. Rather, he reflects the kind 
of position implied in the constitution of some of the modem 
mandalas observed by lung in the course of his Analyses. *1 
have found*, he writes, "the same fact in an overwhelming 
majority of oases: There was never a deity occupying the centre". 
(1) "The place of the deity", he comments, "seems to be taken 
by the wholeness of man." (2) The new value Feuerbach grasped 
was not dissimilar to the idea of the 'wholeness of man' and it
(1) C.G.Jung. Psychology and Religion, p.97*
(2) ibid. p.99*
filled the void whioh would have been left had the
Tiofc
essence of the speciesA immediately taken the place of 
the transcendence of God. We have previously noted the 
poverty of Feuerbach* s understanding of man and human 
existence , his dendeney towards abstract generalisation, 
and his blindness to the estrangement and alienation of 
that existence. This renders his humanism a more ineffective 
answer to nihilism than it might have been.
4« Between Supernaturalism and Naturalism.
Feuerbach saw clearly that a transcendent God above 
and beyond the world, the God of traditional supernatural ism, 
could lead, without the peradoxioel assertion of his 
immanence, to an'^uthentio, perverted religiosity. Such a 
religiosity he identifies indiscriminately with Christian 
Faith. Kis I-Thou philoso hy contained the criterion of 
unreserved concern for the world as the gauge against which 
all ethical questions should be considered. "The well-being 
of every man**, he wrote, "let this be sacred", sacred per se, 
and not for the sake of some super-human principle, value or 
deity, (l)
But we have already seen many times the transcendent 
status of the concept of Essence, the relation to whioh is 
just as likely, as a transcendent God, to divert the concern 
of each slan from his neighbour and thus, under the judgement 
of Feuerbach’s own criterion, be an inauthentic mode of 
human existence.
We have here the issue of supernatusaLisra and naturalism,
(1) "Essence" p.271
one which stands behind centuries of discussion on the 
subject of the doctrine of Crod* The two extremes, pressing 
in opposite directions, make any attempt to force a way 
between the two a difficult business* Clearly, we have the 
issue of supematuralism and naturalism in a specific form, 
the idea of the wholeness of man and the sacredness of his 
existenoe culminating in the concept of the perfect essence 
of humanity set against the naturalistic reduction of the 
divine to the human, and of the explanation of manfs 
spiritual capacities in terms of his relation to the species*
We have often drawn attention to the strange ambiguities of 
this position; but we shall now look at them in a different 
light*
It is impossible to dwell for long upon the 
inconsistencies of Feuerbach*s position without realising 
the fruitful nature of the tensions which are ours as much 
as his* Our own theological task is to work out the 
relation between the concern for the priority of Cod, his 
absolute transcendence and infinite freedom, most characteristic 
of Barth; and concern for man and for the world taken so 
seriously by, for instance, Bonhoeffer and a number of 
theologians who are working on the relation between 
Christianity and secularism* We seem to be torn between 
two opposing loyalties; and the concern for the world is more 
often than not proving the stronger, especially amongst the 
young*
We noted, above, that Feuerbach failed to distinguish 
between a Christian faith unreservedly involved with worldly 
concerns, and one which tries to hide away in an escapist 
religiosity. He might therefore seem to have missed the 
whole significance of the esohatalogical existence of the 
Christian "in the world" but no longer "of the world",
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(John 17:11,14*16) (1). He would seem to have read only 
those passages in which the Christian1s existence is already 
bound up with God and thus free from the world} he does not 
seem to have understood the paradoxical character of this 
existence, nor to have understood that the Christian's so- 
called "other-'worldliness" in fact frees him from subjection 
to the power of the world and thus enables him truly to 
involve himself in the world*
But Feuerbach himself feels another kind of tension, 
that between the individual*s participation in, and worship 
of, the essence of his own humanity, which is a relation to 
himself through the mediation of the love of the neighbour, 
and the love of the neighbour for his own sake alone* He 
ought to have been more aware of this than he was. But the 
tension is there* It has its own peculiar eschat&logioal 
'even now' and 'not yet*; because it looks forward to a 
perfection and a fulfilment of human existence in which it 
already participates, in the knowledge of human potentiality 
revealed in human self-consciousness, and yet this perfect 
fulfilment lies in the future, though man's future and not 
God's.
We must now, however, consider the question of escapist 
religiosity, as it arises out of the polar tension of super­
naturalism and naturalism*
5* Religious Escapism:
The Christian's "excessive transcendental subjectivity",
(l) Bultmann: Theol* of N*T. p.78 of vol.II.
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Feuerbach maintains (1) inevitably leads him to isolate himself 
from the world and his fellow men, because his sense of the 
presence of God increases in inverse proportion to the 
decrease of concern for the world and for other men. (2)
The Christian must needs annihilate the world because it 
shatters the illusory dream world of his imagination, in 
which his God defeats death, heals disease, and overcomes 
all finite limits. (5)
The question that remains for us is: Is concern for 
God exclusive of concern for the world and for the 
neighbour? Feuerbach's failure to distinguish between 
different kinds of faith, some of which are guilty of 
escapism, whilst others not, forbids us from asking less 
radical questions, questions which might presuppose the kind 
of exclusive dualism which Feuerbach's position rather 
uncritically accepts. He presupposes an absolute dualism 
of either God or the world, and then, on finding this 
contradictory, adopts a monistic identification of the 
divine with the human. Having made this identification, 
he can then speak in terms of a kind of dialectic, in which, 
as we have seen, the human other is, and yet is not, God for 
me.
"My fellow man", he writes, "is per se the mediator 
between me and the sacred idea of the species", which is God.
(4) Through my fellow man I meet God, my relation to my 
neighbour implies, one step removed,fmtm God. But in the 
proposition: "Man and woman, the unity of I and Thou, is God" (5)
(1) "Essence" p*l67
(2) do. p.160
C3) do. p.128Wdo. p.159
(5) do. p.vxi
ve have a doctrine of the Immediate knowability of God as 
the substance of human relationship itself.
The problem before us is best dealt with in a 
short exegesis of three passages from I . ohn,ch.4.
We read;
"If a man s ys fI love God* while hating his 
brother ha is a liar. If he does not love the 
brother whom he has seen, it cannot be that he loves 
Ged whom he has not seen." (1) Here, love of the 
neighbour, a worldly concern, is part of, indeed a 
precondition of, love of God, an ultimate concern.
Again; "Though God has never been seen by any man,
G-od himself dwells in us if we love one another; 
his love is brought to perfection within us." (2)
God is invisible to us but comes to us and dwells 
within us in our loving of one another. These two 
Passages begin with God and then speak of the 
relation with God in terms of love of the neighbour.
Our third passage reveals a significant shift; it 
states that love in and of itself participates in 
God, so that the one who loves knows God and is a 
child of God. "Everyone who loves is a child of 
God and knows God, but the unloving know nothing of 
God". (3) Clearly, the point made in all three 
passages is that love of God and love of the 
neighbour are not conceived in terms of a dualistic 
either/or, but seem to imply a kind of participation 
of the neighbour in God and God in the neighbour.
This is not a monistic identification of the two 
because God is still somehow spoken of as distinct 
from the neighbour. Here is the authentic paradox 
that feuerbach has missed. But in what does it 
really consist? This will have to be taken up 
another time.
The result of this short diversion enables us better to 
meet such questions as; "How then can I at once love God and 
a mortal wife?" (4) "Do I not thereby place God on the same 
footing as my wife?" It also makes us even less happy than 
we might otherwise have been with Paul's view of marriage in
I John 4:20 
I John 4ft 12
(3) I John 4:7,8 
(4; "Essence" P,167
I Cor*7*32-40# Here Paul failed to graap the paradox 
he so clearly understood in other contexts.
6. Feuerbach's soteriology:
The other, or worldly pole of the dichotomy between 
transcendental religiosity and concern for the world, is 
best considered in the form of the soteriology which 
Feuerbach proposes a3 an alternative to the evasive 
attempt to negate the world in an exclusive love of God.
His soteriology consists not in an attempt to give 
meaning to the world, which has lost its God, in isolation 
from other human beings; it is rather to see in concern for 
the world and others the end and purpose which God once gave 
to us. Man himself is the meaning of God, for God has 
become man. Feuerbach reaches his position, which has much 
in common with the concern for the world and the human in 
our secular views of Christianity, by way of a particularly 
one-sided, though as we have seen, powerful interpretation 
of the Lutheran doctrine of the incarnation. Our answer 
cannot simply be to avoid all Lutheran elements which leave 
this way open, and thus avoid Feuerbach. His soteriology 
is worth taking seriously. It may be summarised as 
salvation through love of the neighbour, without the 
traditional transcendent God. The weakness In this lies 
in the concept of essence of man, in which the individual 
seems to have an almost mystical participation, Such a 
ooncept has little philosophical foundation today, and there 
is not much point in wishing this were otherwise. We would 
be happier to remain with the concrete reality of particular 
personal relations, and to refrain from synthetic 
generalisations about such relations, as if these would 
give them any deeper meaning. Whether this kind of answer
will prove satisfactory in our present theological 
debate remains to be seen.
7. The Meaning of Transcendences
Our last point is one of clarification. We have 
seen the categoxy * transcendence* used in a number of 
ways, each r vealing a distinct theological facet of the 
main problems under discussion. Transcendere = to
transcend, means to pass beyond, to climb or surmount, 
to cross from somewhere to somewhere else.
We can speak of modem means of travel transcending 
the horse and cart, of human intslligenoe transcending 
animal instinct, of man's increasing success in controlling 
his environment transcending his primitive submission to it. 
To transcend is to pass out beyond the confines of one 
sphere into another sphere no longer limited in the same 
way. To transcend in a straightforward empirioal oontext 
in which both the transcendent and the transcended are 
indubitably spheres of finite being is clearly 
distinguishable from the transcendence of the finite in the 
infinite. But many more distinctions must be made when we 
move, as we now do, to the theological use of the category 
Transcendence.
The deities of Hinduism seem to be personified powers 
of the natural and supernatural worlds, as such they 
transcend any particular entities within these worlds, they 
transcend, for instance, the images which represent them in 
oultio worship. The Canaanite Gods were personified powers 
of heaven, earth and abyss (i)j they transcended the concrete 
world about them, but remained, for Israel, part of the 
(1) Von Had: Theol. of O.T. Vol.I p.218
10lf,
created world. Yahweh transcends his creation in quit® a 
different sense. The deities of the ancient east were 
known more immediately and less ambiguously than T&hweh; because 
their relation to the world was more immediate, its. less 
paradoxical. Yahweh, on the other hand, was a mystery, an 
enigma to his people; his transoendenoe involved something 
far more radical then the transcendence of the Canaanit© 
deities.
Feuerbach's concept of essence of man transcends the 
Individual man, it denotes a perfection unknown among 
e listing men. His conception of Cod as the unity of man 
with man, which is a transcendence of the isolated I in his 
relation with the Thou. But we speak of a transcendence, 
here, which remains within the bounds of finite being; and 
thus to worship such a God is in traditional terms idolatry: 
(Rom.1s23). Whether the radical kind of transcendence, 
one which must involve a negation of the divinity of all 
created being, is also involved in the relation of love 
between man andhis neighbour, is the unresolved question of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, we have been able in a close 
study of Feuerbach, to clarify what this qua tion involves, 
and to formulate, in a preliminary kind of way, the difficulties 
we must meet to answer it. Feuerbach undoubtedly reaches the 
contemporary theological scene with a relevance that few 19th 
century thinkers do, and which, perhaps, he himself has never 
done until quite recently.
